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ABSTRACT
Applying the Christian principles of depraved human
nature, expectation of detrimental behavior from irrational
actors, and rational attempts to limit the destructiveness of
war, Augustine would conclude that the declared nuclear
weapons states have a moral obligation to prevent proliferation
of nuclear weapons. Laws suitable to the needs of the times
are the appropriate method for accom plishing this.
The
pending Com prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one such
law.
Because the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions and
establishes an intrusive inspection scheme, it will have an
impact on the U. S. Department of Energy (DoE). DoE should
respond by participating in the new inspection organization, by
interpreting fin d in g s resulting from in sp ectio n s, and by
continuing management of the Nevada Test Site. The CTBT may
be efficacious in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation in
the short term.
Considering a longer-term perspective, a
frightening prospect emerges as a result of an Augustinian
assessment of human nature.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Saint Augustine was a realist. Born in 354 to a pagan
Roman father and a Christian mother, he lived a normal
childhood. Questioning the usefulness of learning, he resisted
education and participated in childish pranks, petty thefts and
prideful display. That changed in late adolescence, however,
when he began a patently dissolute lifestyle and read Cicero’s
Hortenslus in 375.

Reading Cicero imbued in Augustine a lifelong interest in
philosophy.

As a result, four rather distinct periods are

apparent in Augustine’s life and writings. First, as a young
man, Augustine was interested in Manicheeism.

Mani, a

Persian, in practical terms had claimed to be divine and had set
forth philosophical propositions which held that good and evil
were co-equal moral entities. Most of Manicheeism’s content
was irrational, in Augustine’s view, and this eventually led to
his abandoning it in favor of Platonism.
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As

a Platonist,

Augustine in

his

second period was

heavily influenced by the writings of Plotinus.

For example,

according to Karl Jaspers (197), the Platonic view of God is one
of the unity of the good, the true and the beautiful.

God in this

view represents or is equivalent to the eternal world of ideas,
the “cosmos of becoming,” in Jaspers’ terminology.

Plotinus,

according to Jaspers, tended to the Platonic view of ideas as an
independent realm.

In C o n fe s sio n s

7:9, Augustine himself

describes the Platonic view that God is powerful and desirable,
as advanced by Plotinus.

Augustine converted to C hristianity

in 387.

In S t.

Augustine’s Early Theory of Man. Robert J. O’Connell describes
A ugustine’s early post-conversion w ritings.

These writings

include Against the Academics. S o lilo q u ie s. On Order. On the
Immortality of the Soul, and are examples of his third period of
intellectual activity.

In the writings of this period, Augustine

attempts to meld the Platonic and Plotinistic philosophies with
the Christianity which was fresh and vibrant in his mind.

Augustine was ordained a priest in 391, and later Bishop
of Hippo.

This began the fourth period of his intellectual life,

that of the mature writings.

In this final and most productive

period, Augustine produced the C o n fe ssio n s, the Ci tv of G od.
and On Free Choice of the Will as well as a vast body of other
writings and sermons.

In this period, which lasted to his death
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in 430, Augustine is concerned not with philosophy, but with a
form of philosophical theology.

His emphasis is not to reconcile

secular philosophy and Christianity, but rather with questions
of right and wrong, with salvation, and with the impact of
C h ristian ity

upon

p olitics,

ethics

and

p ractical

affairs.

Augustine’s conception of God is quite different from that of his
Platonic period.

In this fourth period he conceives of God in a

Judean rather than Greek sense as a triune being, the source of
all ideas.

Augustine comes to understand that the Platonic

position cannot see a need for sacrifice and humility on the
part of the religious believer (Rist 3).

It is significant that early

in this fourth period Augustine produced the C o n f e s s io n s .
which, in large measure, quotes Scripture rather than secular
philosophers to advance his arguments (Rist 15).

Describing his

break with the Platonists in Confessions 7:21, Augustine writes,
“Their pages have not the mien of the true love of God.”

This

study concentrates on Augustine’s mature writings because of
their applicability to modern political and ethical conditions.

The world-historical setting of Augustine’s lifetim e was
distressing.

The

Roman

Empire

was clearly

in

decline.

Continuous warfare along the Rhine took an ever-increasing toll
of Roman strength in manpower and finance.

In 410, Germanic

bands under Alaric entered and sacked Rome.

This was the

occasion of Augustine’s writing Ci tv of God, which attempted to
show that the enfeeblement of Roman power was not a result
of an abandonment of the classical pagan deities, as some

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

claimed, but of a glaring lack of regard for simple moral values.
Christianity could restore Roman virtue, Augustine claimed.

Disintegration

of the Roman system

This caused Augustine much distress.
im posed

as

part

A u g u stin e’s

view

of
to

philosophical problems.
political,

ethical

perspective.

and

the

Roman

much

continued apace.

The loss of social order
system

would

unhappiness

and

lead
to

in

many

Thus Augustine was led to consider
m ilitary

topics

from

his

Christian

These are set forth in City of God. E n ch irid io n .

A gainst Faustus. and in other writings.

Given Augustine’s fine

and logical intellect and the circumstances of his world, it is not
surprising that hé sought to explain the human condition and
human behavior as it actually is, rather than as one might wish
it to be.

“Whatever else Augustine may be,” John H. Randall

writes in Hellenistic Wavs of Deliverance and the Making of the
Christian
realist,

Synthesis, “he is surely what we like today to call a

with just that salutary freedom

that suits the temper of the times” (193).

from

sentimentality

This is the essence of

the realist position.

POLITICAL REALISM

The Augustinian view of intrinsic human depravity leads
directly

to modern

Realistic political

theories. All Realist

theories depend upon the observational method

(Morgenthau
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4).

That which is observed concerning human behavior and

concerning the behavior of states in the international arena is
the basis of Realism.

Thus Realism holds that international

political affairs are governed by principles which have their
origin in human nature displayed as observed actual behaviors
rather than as behaviors which one might otherwise desire.
Thus, in all Realist theories, the world of human endeavor, and
the practice of international politics in that world, is necessarily
im perfect from a purely rational perspective.

Realism holds

that moral principles can never be realized, but can only be
approached and approximated.

Realism attempts to gain the

lesser evil in its approach, rather than an absolute good.

There are three fundamental principles common to all
varieties

of Realist theory.

These

principles

provide

an

intellectual framework by which the student of international
affairs may interpret events and evaluate situations.
principle is the state-centric principle.

The first

This holds that the most

important actors in international relations are national entities
organized

throughout a particular region

or

territory.

In

ancient times, such political entities were city-states; in more
recent years, they are nation-states.

The s e c o n d

fundamental

principle

is

that,

on

the

international level, state behavior can be explained in rational
terms.
national

John W. Kingdon has developed a model of internal
decision-m aking

wherein

dom estic

policy

is
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not

invariably made in a rational fashion.

By contrast, concerning

the international arena, John C. Harsanyi points out that there
are “few areas o f social behavior where rational calculation
plays

a more

politics.”

im portant part than it does in

international

A mistake has serious consequences. Therefore, most

foreign policy decisions are the result of careful analysis of the
advantages

and

disadvantages

alternative policies.

expected

to

re su lt

from

In many situations, the assumption of

rational behavior or significant elements of rational behavior is
a valid sim plifying assumption which permits analysis.

The th ird fundamental principle is that states seek power
and determine their interests in terms of power.

Power in this

context means the ability of one nation to influence or to some
extent determ ine

the actions or behavior of other nations.

Nations seek pow er for its own sake or for the purpose of
achieving other goals.

Hans J. Morgenthau, for many years a faculty member
and dean at the University of Chicago, set forth the tenets of
classical Realism in his 1948 book, republished in 1966, Politics
Among

N atio n s.

More recently, Kenneth N. W altz describes

Morgenthau's Realism as “reductionistic”

because it holds that

individual nation-states are the primary actors in international
affairs, rather than some supra-national actor.
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C oncerning

classical

R e alistic

theory,

M orgenthau

describes six specific tenets which extend the basic principles
set forth above.

First. Realism holds that human nature has not

changed in millennia and in fact cannot be changed.

This

unflattering, Augustinian claim is the central tenet of classical
Realism and indeed of all Realistic theories.
improve society,” Morgenthau

asserts, “it is

understand the laws by which society lives.
these laws being impervious

“In order to

first necessary to
The operation of

to our preferences, men will

ehallenge them only at the risk of failure” (4)

Realism holds

that its view of human nature is based on objective observation
and that a credible rational theory m ust be based on these
observations.

Only then can a rational theory be developed

which reflects the facts and provides
the possibility in politics of distinguishing between
. . . what is true objectively and rationally,
supported by evidence and illum inated by reason,
and what is only a subjective judgm ent, divorced
from the facts as they are and informed by
prejudice and wishful thinking. (4)

M orgenthau

asserts

that

the

facts

concomitant behavior were known
Because the basic facts remain
rational.

of

human

nature

and

thousands of years ago.

unchanged, toreject them is not

Such a rejection is an assumption

affairs there are “opinions but no truths”

that in political

(5).
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8
M orgenthau’s

R ealistic

theory

contains

the

unstated

assumptions that an aspect of human nature is to act according
to one’s interest, and that this nature ultimately drives national
behavior.

According to Morgenthau, therefore, the s e c o n d

tenet in Realism is interest, defined in terms of power.
tend

to

behave

according

to

their

interest,

Nations

rather

than

according to any other factor. This concept enables the scholar
of international politics to understand the actions of nations
and of statesmen by understanding the basic motivations of
their respective practices.

The disinterested scholar may thus

understand the thoughts and actions of each political actor and
make predictions based on assumptions of rational behavior
w ithin

the

lim itations

imposed

by

the

nature of political

science.

This concept of interest defined

by power “imposes

intellectual discipline upon the observer.”

It “infuses rational

order” into what is otherwise a rather disorganized and chaotic
subject,

in

d isc ip lin e,

M orgenthau’s
M orgenthau

view.
discovers

Given
in

this

m ost

intellectual
nations

an

“astounding continuity in foreign policy” which responds only
in small degree to successive leaders possessing diverse moral
qualities, motives and intellects (6).

T hird, interest can be described in a political and cultural
context.

Morgenthau asserts that there is no fixed, universal

definition of interest.

Archie Bahm was for many years full
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professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico. In his
book What Makes Acts Right?. Bahm points out that “all words
are

more or less ambiguous” (56). This is particularly true for

the

word “interest.”

interest

consists

against armed
materials,
markets.

However, in the present context national

largely

of internal

attack from external

security

and

security

sources, access to raw

m inerals and petroleum, and access

to international

Most nations regard an attempt to compromise any of

these interests as an act of war.

The basic idea of interest, according to Morgenthau, is
indeed rather fixed.

The details vary with time and place.

It is

the essence o f all politics for nations, subnational groups and
individuals

to

pursue

their

respective

interests.

Indeed,

nations and subnational groups are aggregations of those of
similar interest.
T h ucydides’
interest is

In Politics Among Nations. Morgenthau quotes
H istory of the Peloponesian

the

individuals” (8).
W ashington’s

W ar: “identity of

surest of bonds whether between

states or

Morgenthau also goes on to quote George

remarks regarding interest

as

a principle of

g o v ern m en t.
A small knowledge of human nature will convince
us that, with far the greatest part o f mankind,
interest is the governing principle; and that almost
every man is more or less, under its influence.
M otives of public virtue may for a time, or in
particular instances, actuate men to the observance
of a conduct purely disinterested, but they are not
of them selves sufficient to produce a persevering

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of
social duty.
Few men are capable of making a
continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or
advantage, to the common good.
It is vain to
exclaim against the depravity of human nature on
this account; the fact is so, the experience of every
age and nation has proved it and we must in a great
measure, change the constitution of man, before we
can make it otherwise. No institution not built on
the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed.
(8)

The kind of interest which determines political action in
concrete circumstances depends on the “political and cultural
context” (9) in which foreign policy is created.

For example,

Japanese naval behavior on 07 December 1941 was based on
conceptions alien to those typical of the Occidental mind.
Interests based on notions of honor and of ojl, or obligation,
steadily dwindling oil stocks, a deteriorating wartime situation
in China, as well as a nearly desperate international situation,
were the factors uppermost in the minds of Japanese leaders.
Thus

the Japanese

were

behaving

according

to their own

concept of interest, defined by power.

The concept of power, according to Morgenthau, varies
according to time and circumstance.

Power is anything that

“establishes and maintains the control of man over man” (9).
consists

of a spectrum

of means ranging

It

from immediate

physical violence to psychological manipulation and appeal to
moral obligations.

The nature of power and the manner in

which it is used is a reflection of the political and cultural
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11
environm ent.

The nature of power being exercised in the

international environment, say, on

15 December 1941, was

rather different from the nuclear standoff during the Cold War.
Both are different yet from the largely economic power being
exercised in the present world system.

F o u rth , international realism acknowledges the moral and
ethical significance of political action.

As Rosemarie Tong has

pointed out, there is a tension between moral obligation and
the im peratives of successful political action (62).

Realism

recognizes this and is not willing either to ignore the often
brutal facts of international relations or to make moral tenets
of no effect.

M orgenthau’s Realism maintains
cannot

be

applied

in

the

international

principles of universal applicability.
interpreted

that

moral principles
arena

as

abstract

Such high values must be

in actual circumstances.

A natural person may

claim as a principle, “Let justice be done, even if the world
perish.”

Such a person may choose to give up life itself rather

than to compromise his cherished beliefs.
cannot apply to governments.

Such an attitude

In R om ans 13:4, Paul proclaims

that a magistrate is a “minister . . . to thee for good,” that is, to
the individual.

A minister or an administration cannot be a

principal, but must be an agent.

A national state, being an

agent rather than a principal, has no right to claim that moral
principle in the name of those in its care.

The state has no
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right to perm it moral scruples to interfere with successful
political action intended to result in national survival, which is
itself a high

moral principle.

Alfred Thayer Mahan was

President of the Naval War College when he wrote The Problem
of Asia and the Effect upon International P o litics. Therein he
a s se rte d
It is vain to expect governments to act continuously
on any other ground than national interest. They
have no right to do so, being agents and not
principals. (187)

More

recently

George

F.

Kennan

has

expressed

him self

regarding the same thought.
The principles of a government are not entirely the
same as those of an individual. The individual, in
choosing his principles, engages only himself. He is
at liberty to sacrifice his own practical interests in
the service of some higher and more unselfish ideal.
But this sort of sacrifice is one that a responsible
governm ent, and a dem ocratic government in
particular, is unable to take upon itself. It is an
agent, not a principal. It is only a representative of
others. (120)

Thus

the behavior of governments everywhere reflects

the

nature of the persons therein, but the governments themselves
do not follow exactly the same moral principles which one
might choose to apply to oneself.

Augustine expressly gives

assent to this principle when he denies to individuals the right
of self-defense, but confirms to the Roman government the
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obligation to make war and to carry out capital punishments
(Langan 177).

In Just War. Political Realism and Faith. Bernard

Adeney quotes E pistle 475, in which Augustine proclaims
As to killing others to
approve of this, unless
or a public functionary
defense of others or of
(33)

defend one’s life, I do not
one happens to be a soldier
acting not for himself but in
the city in which he resides.

This is an Augustinian exam ple of just war theory and of
political realism.

It also reflects the tension between Christian

morality and effective

political

action.

It is

the

somber

distinction between the Earthly City and the Heavenly City in
Augustine’s famous book. The City of God.

Morgenthau
political morality

asserts

that

there

can

be

no

effective

w ithout

a complete consideration

of the

consequences of a proposed action which itself appears to be in
accord

with

moral

principles.

consequentialist views

that,

This

in judging

consider the intent of the actor.
illustrative example.
Finland.
consider

In

1939,

reflects
any act,

A ugustine’s
one

must

Morgenthau provides an
the Soviet Union

invaded

France and G reat Britain were thereby obliged to
two

separate,

but

related,

questions.

The

first

question was whether the Soviet action was contrary to the
Covenant of the League of Nations.

If the invasion did violate

the Covenant, the second question was what practical action
would France and Great Britain take in their own interests.
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There

was

no

question

but

that

the

Soviet

performed an act which the Covenant forbade.

Union

had

In response,

France and Great Britain saw to it that the Soviet Union was
expelled from the League.

The question then became one of

understanding how the Soviet invasion affected the interests of
France and Great Britain and how the invasion affected the
distribution of power between France and Great Britain on one
hand and the Soviet Union and other potentially or actually
hostile nations on the other hand.

The major nation at that

time hostile to France and Great Britain was Nazi Germany.
Acting on high moral and legal principles alone, France and
Great Britain prepared to join Finland in its war against the
Soviet Union. They were prevented

from

this action only

because Sweden refused permission for their troops to cross
Swedish territory on their way to Finland.

Had the Swedish

refusal not prevented them, France and Great Britain would
shortly have been at war with N azi Germany and with the
Soviet Union, to the considerable detrim ent of their national
survival and of the well-being of their respective populations
( 12).

This policy on the part of France and Great Britain
Morgenthau calls a “classic example” of legalism and maudlin
morality

intruding

considering

both

into a political

decision.

morality and interests,

Rather than

France and Great

Britain considered only a narrow morality of international law.
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The resulting decision had no relation to the higher issue of
national survival (13).

F ifth . Realism is not willing to equate nationalism with
the will or favor of deity or to equate the aspirations of a
particular

nation

u n iv e rse”

(1 1 ).

illuminating

with

“the

moral laws

M orgenthau

which

provides

a

govern

the

p a rtic u la rly

passage.

To know that nations are subject to the moral law is
one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty
what is good and evil in the relations among nations
is quite another.
There is a world of difference
between the belief that all nations stand under the
judgm ent of God, inscrutable to the human mind,
and the blasphemous conviction that God is always
on one’s side and that what one wills oneself cannot
fail to be willed by God also.
The lighthearted equation between a p articular
nationalism and the counsels of Providence is
morally indefensible, for it is the very sin against
which the Greek tragedians and the B iblical
prophets have warned rulers and ruled.
That
equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable
to engender the distortion in judgment which, in
the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations
and civilizations — in the name of moral principle,
ideal, or God himself. (11)

Morgenthau maintains that it is exactly the considerations of
interest

d efined

by

power

that

prevents

m ost

nations,

including our own, from “moral excess and . . . political folly.”
The United States is perhaps characterized by an excess of
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millenarian zeal but can respect the interests of foreign nations
and promote its own interests.

Moderation of moral judgment,

Morgenthau tells us, results in moderation of policy, to the
benefit of all (11).

Aristotle and Augustine would agree.

Sixth, the differences between Realism and other theories
of politics are real and profound.

Realism has a “distinctive

intellectual and moral attitude” (11).

This attitude concerns

itself with thought in the international political realm.

The

Realist is quite aware of modes of thought other than political
modes based

on

a knowledge of human

understanding of interest.

behavior and an

Realism differs from the “legalistic-

moralistic approach” in that it refuses to “impose standards of
thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere”
(12)

Realism thereby subserves moral ends by means of a

penetrating understanding of the realities of human nature and
of the admittedly brutal, anarchic international environment.
One does not better oneself by ignoring unpleasant realities or
by failing to act upon them.

Robert E. Osgood performed his doctoral work at Harvard
University under the direction of McGeorge Bundy.

As a young

faculty member at the University of Chicago, he served under
Morgenthau’s direction.

The first edition of Osgood’s book

Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign R e la tio n s was
published in 1953, and a revised version published in 1964.
Osgood presents a history of international political relations
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from the Spanish-American War to the Cold War.

He also

presents a compelling argument for the inclusion of moral and
ethical principles in the practice of international relations.

Osgood respects ideals and moral values.
Christian-liberal-humanisnc ideals

“I accept the

. . .” (20) he writes.

Osgood

expresses appreciation and admiration for “principles of right
conduct” and “honesty, truthfulness,
kindness,

fair

people’s affairs”

play,

law fulness,

fidelity

to obligations,

nonintervention

in

other

(7).

Osgood also accepts the Realist view, and he claims that
Unrealistic expectations concerning human conduct
encourage extravagant asp iratio n s; and among
nations, as among individuals, the result is apt to be
disillusionment and an erratic fluctuation from one
extreme in conduct to another. (3)

Combining these two streams of thought, Osgood’s central thesis
is that one must judge a political act on a moral basis by the
motive and also on a political basis by the outcome.
judgm ents

together

are

necessary

appreciation of any political act.
assessm ent
respect

the

of

self-interest”

fact

supplement reason”

a right and proper

This is because a “rational

dem ands

that “human
(446).

for

The two

nature

that

the

demands

statesman
that ideals

Calculations of pure self-interest

are likely to lead to unfortunate results.
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Osgood’s modification of Morgenthau’s Realistic position is
that transcendent

ideals

have played a sig n ifican t role

determining American foreign policy.

in

Osgood asserts that

a

steady and effective foreign policy devoid of m oral appeal is
scarcely

conceivable” (447).

reflection o f Francis

This sentim ent is

merely

a

Schaeffer’s contention that humankind

cannot function without an adequate conception

o f morality

and that this morality must have its basis in absolutes (14).

In his
K enneth

N.

1979 book Theorv
W altz presents

of

International— P q Htiq&,

an extension

of

classical R ealist international political theory.

M orgenthau s
Terming his

theory Structural Realism, or Neorealism, W altz distinguishes
betw een
theories.
the

red u ctio n ist

and

systemic

in tern atio n al

p o litical

Reductionist theory in general concerns itself with

behavior

of

parts

or

of

small

units.

R eductionist

international political theory therefore concerns itself with the
behavior of individual
explain

international

nations.

Thus reductionist

outcomes by means

theories

o f elem ents

and

combinations of elements at the national or even sub-national
level.

In “Reductionist and Systemic Theories,” W altz builds
upon M orgenthau’s belief that international outcom es are the
result of national characteristics.
outcom es

are

characteristics

th e

resu lt

but also

He claims that international

certainly

in

p a rt

of the influence and

of

national

effects
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supranational system.

In “Political Structures,” Waltz describes

“the structures of the system and its interacting units” (94)

Such a political system is an ordering or an arrangement
of the parts of the system.
ways.

Political structures vary in three

First, they vary by ordering principles (81).

The present

international political system consists of about 150 sovereign
or semisovereign actors which recognize for the most part no
authority higher then their own.

Therefore the international

environment is one of anarchic self-help.

This arrangement is

in considerable contrast to that which prevails inside most
national entities.

There, the various governm ental entities,

bureaus, legislative bodies, and courts function in recognized
hierarchies of authority and power.

Second, the political structures vary by specification of
functions of the different parts (87).

In “Theory of World

Politics,” Keohane describes Waltz as claiming that the nations
perform sim ilar functions and that this second variable is of
lesser importance.
heritage,

or

However, because of geography, historical

n atio n al

character,

many

nations

distinct functions in the international community.

have

quite

For example,

Switzerland has for many centuries functioned as a diplomatic
n eu tra l,

re la y in g

m essages

betw een

n atio n s

at

war.

Switzerland arranged for the exchange of diplom ats between
Japan and the U nited States in 1942, and delivered peace
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feelers from Japan to the Soviet Union in 1945.

Sweden has

functioned similarly in recent centuries.

T hird,

structures

vary by the

power of the units (92).

relative

capabilities

or

In the present international system,

Saudi Arabia, Austria, Iceland and Denmark all have military
capabilities and powers of various sorts, including economic
powers.

These attributes are of a different nature and degree

than those possessed by the former Soviet Union or the United
States.

Relative capabilities change over time.

For example,

modern G reat Britain would not dare attem pt any action in
North America such as those accomplished in the period 18121815.

Nor would Germany now attempt military operations in

North Africa.

By means of these considerations. Waltz expands classical
international political Realism into a deductive theory with
claims to
Realism

predictive power.

or Neorealism, considers system -w ide processes

explain international events.
authority

This theory, called Structural

exists

to

It assumes that no supranational

(Spanier 53).

Thus

study

of interactions

between nations is a reductionistic approach, whereas study of
the behavior of the international system

as

a whole is a

systemic approach.

N eorealistic

theory

identifies

regularities

within the international political system.

of behavior

These regularities are
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recurring

cycles of war and

balance of power obtains.

persistent systems wherein

a

The explanatory and predictive

power of Neorealism lies in the fact that it predicts that these
two phenomena necessarily
system.

follow

from the nature of the

They are intrinsically part of the international political

system .

W altz’s Neorealism is a secular theory of international
relations based, as we have seen, on strict observation of
human nature and of the facts of the international regime.
Other thinkers have reached the same conclusions based on
somewhat different premises.

D aniel 9:26 concludes that “unto

the end, war and desolations are determined.”

This statement

must be predicated on D aniel’s observation that the secular
system is not easily changed.

M a tth e w

24:6-8 quotes Jesus’

conclusion, based on very abundant evidence available to Him,
that “ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars . . . for nation
shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom . . .
these are the beginning of sorrows.”

Jesus may have projected

his views from personal experience.
adolescence.
convulsed
Romans.

by

His

home

sedition

region
and

of

all

In His childhood and
G alilee

guerrilla

was

w arfare

repeatedly
against

He reasonably expected this to continue.
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CHAPTER 2

AUGUSTINIAN MORAL BASIS

INTRODUCTION

Several arguments might be adduced to support the
proposition that the United States, with or without the
cooperation of other nuclear-armed nations, has a moral
imperative to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to
parties deemed likely to use them in a detrimental manner.
The argument selected for consideration in this study is based
on the Christian ethics of Augustine of Hippo.

It is the

argument which he would most likely use in the present
situation.

The international arena is one of the most amoral in
hum an experience.

For centuries, the principal factor in

determining international relations has been expedience of
policy. The morals of those policies have been a secondary
consideration. Of all areas of human endeavor, it is possibly
the most complex and most frustrating (Thompson 1). In Man.
the State and War. Kenneth Waltz provides an overview:

22
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Each state pursues its own interests, however
defined, in ways it judges best. Force is a means of
achieving the external ends of states because there
exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling
the conflicts of interests that inevitably arise among
similar units. (238)

In this arena, various nations and sub-national groups seek to
develop or to otherwise obtain nuclear weapons.

The potential

uses to which these destructive devices may be put has caused
concern in the governments of the present nuclear powers and
among thoughtful persons (Mandelbaum 22).

In response to this concern, John Deutch, formerly a
faculty

m em ber

Technology,

and

form erly

provost at M assachusetts
Undersecretary

Institute

of D efense,

and

of
now

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has analyzed the
present international scene relating to proliferation of nuclear
weapons.

He concludes in a Foreign

A ffairs article that the

United States should “ . . . move nonproliferation to a higher
priority” (132)

Deutch recommends that the United States

should:

•

“publicly state that any use of a nuclear weapon

would be considered a casus belli “

•

“ p u b lic ly

[N onproliferation

Treaty]

s ta te

th a t

v io la tio n

would trigger sanctions,

of

the

including

multilateral or unilateral military action”
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•

“maintain military forces appropriate to

make these

threats credible”

•

upgrade

and

em phasize

intelligence

ac tiv ities

against proliférant nations and groups

•

extend

security

guarantees

to nations

willing

to

forgo development of nuclear weapons

•

establish

bilateral

arrangements, possibly through

the U.N. Security Council

•

reemphasize inspection efforts of the International

Atomic Energy Agency (133)

These are

com prehensive recommendations

import, set forth by a recognized expert.
writing in N u c le u s

of serious

Kenneth N. Luongo,

on behalf of the Union of Concerned

Scientists, advocates a broadly similar set of policies which fall
short of a formal declaration of war against any power which
would use a nuclear weapon (1).

Other authors have advocated

that various measures be taken.

The essential element of all

these

suggestions

is that

the

United

States, other

nuclear

powers or the United Nations should take active measures to
dissuade or actively to prevent presently non-nuclear powers
from acquiring nuclear weapons.
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Many commentators have raised issues of the morality of
war and the morality of nuclear war (Thompson).

Fewer have

addressed the issue of the moral basis on which the presently
nuclear-armed nations impose their will in a manner similar to
that

suggested

by

Deutch

upon

nations

deem ed

likely

proliferate or to use a nuclear weapon after proliferation.

to
The

purpose, then, of this study is to examine, from the Augustinian
position, the moral basis by which the United States and other
nuclear

powers

impose

such

nonproliferation

measures

on

other nations.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A nuclear weapon functions rapidly to release copious
quantities of energy. The result is an explosion and release of
radiation.

When a nuclear weapon detonates a few hundred

feet above a target at the earth’s surface, a fireball and blast
wave rapidly form and extend to the surface.
the fireball reaches temperatures
everything

At the ground,

of thousands of degrees and

incinerates

virtually

for

several

miles

in all

directions.

The blast wave shatters any man-made object and,

depending on the weapon’s design and other factors, can also
excavate several hundred feet into the earth.
overturns

locomotives, damages

translates

other

objects.

The blast wave

and distorts structures, and

Electrom agnetic

radiation

ignites
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flam m able

objects.

Ionizing

radiation

accom panies

the

explosion and causes damage to objects and trauma and death
to living organisms.

The fireball and residue from the target

coalesce into a column of dust and smoke which rises for miles
into the atmosphere.

Soon after, radioactive particles settle out

downwind from the site, producing “fallout”
to humans for decades if not centuries.

that is dangerous

Despite a considerable

number of experiments, nuclear explosive devices have not yet
been put to practical peaceful use.

A bomb using chemical explosives is relatively limited in
the amount of damage which it can cause, and the damage is
limited in areal extent.

During the 1940 air attacks on London,

residents could take shelter from conventional bombs in the
subway system or in ordinary fortifications and redoubts of
various configurations.
sim ilar

d efen se

incomparably
perhaps

the

For the general population, there is no

against

a

more destructive.

n u clear
In

w eapon,

which

is

America, for example,

only completely effective shelter from nuclear

attack is the deep underground facilities for a few military
personnel

at

Cheyenne

Colorado.

The ultimate survivability of even that redoubt is an

open question.

M ountain,

near

Colorado

Springs,

Any nuclear weapon is much less precise than

is a conventional weapon; collateral damage to objects and
persons

not

under

attack

is

inevitable.

For

the general

population, there are only two effective defenses against a
nuclear weapon.

One is to not be in the vicinity when a nuclear

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27
weapon functions.

Much the better choice is to prevent,

possibly by political means, the construction of the device in
the first place

The interests of America, and the interests of mankind,
are that no surface detonation of a nuclear weapon ever take
place again.

One way to prevent a surface detonation is to

credibly threaten those persons, organizations and states which
would be inclined to use an existing nuclear weapon with a
com parable response.

Thus

forms a balance of terror;

common phrase has been “mutually assured destruction.”

a

The

idea is that no party would use a nuclear weapon on another
because of fear of a sim ilar response by the party attacked.
Until recently, this was

the situation regarding the United

States and the former Soviet Union.
been

the

proliferation

of

A more recent concern has

nuclear

weapons

m aterial

and

technology to Third World nations, to subnational groups and to
entirely informal groups.

It is not clear that a nuclear standoff

would be effective in these new circumstances.

A second method of control is to prevent presently non
nuclear parties deemed likely to use nuclear weapons from
acquiring or constructing them.

This idea forms the basis of

the nonproliferation efforts by the Western nations presently
m aintaining

nuclear

arsenals.

This

method

depends

on

diplomatic efforts, control and denial of nuclear materials and
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necessary tooling, and control and denial of access to the
information required to construct a nuclear weapon.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS

Augustine’s Philosophy

Human Rationality

In the C onfessions 5:3, Augustine describes the efforts of
m a th e m a tic ia n s
phenomena.

and

astro n o m ers

to

p re d ic t

natural

These men used observations and mathematics to

predict partial and total eclipses of the sun and moon.

“They

calculated the day and the hour of the eclipse,” Augustine
writes, “and whether it would be total or partial, and their
reckonings were found correct because it all happened as they
predicted.”

Augustine points out that the scientists “wrote

down the principles which they had discovered” and that other
persons could read these documents and put the theories to the
test by seeing

if the predictions reflected observed reality,

which they in fact did.

A u g u stin e
understanding,”
In L e tte r

notes

further

th a t

th is

“ reason

and

that is, this rationality, has its source in God.

120, Augustine proclaims that rationality is “that

faculty by which He [God] made us superior to all other living
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beings” (130)

Augustine

is

careful to define

God.

In

C o n fe s sio n s 10:24 he writes, “I found my God, who is Truth
itself.”

In C o n fe ssio n s 4:15, Augustine refers to God as “the

supreme good that does not vary.”

Pine-Coffin’s translation of

C o n fe s s io n s quotes the English-language Knox
Augustine quotes Scripture.
quotes J a m e s

Bible where

In C o n fessio n s 4:15, Augustine

1:17: “with you there can be no change, no

swerving from your course.”

The more literally-translated K in g

James Bible puts it somewhat more clearly, “. . . with whom is
no variableness, neither shadow of turning.”
word is JcapaA,A.aYn

The central Greek

which George Berry’sinterlinear

Greek-

English Bible translates as “variation.”

In C o n fessio n s 4:15, Augustine continues, “It seemed to
me that this unity was the seat of the rational mind and was
the natural state of truth and perfect goodness.”
thus conceives of God as invariable.
source of truth, goodness

and

Augustine

This invariableness is the

human rationality.

As

he

describes in C o n fessio n s 6, Augustine came to understand that
the God of the Bible speaks and acts with sense and precision.
Augustine’s deity is thus a God of reason and order, as he
describes in The Trinity 6,

Mankind, created by this God, has

not only the gift of reason and order, but also the obligation to
use these gifts in a wise and rational manner.

Socrates, it may

be noted, took a sim ilar position, that his rational inquiries
regarding truth were a

result of his obedience to deity as

understood the term (61).
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To

em phasize

the

source

of

reason,

A ugustine

in

C o n fessio n s 5:3 chides the very scientists who have rationally
discovered
reason

m ethods

com es

to

from

calculate eclipses.
the

invariable

God,

A lthough

their

in

they

pride

nevertheless ascribe it to their quite variable selves.
exam ple

of

the

v ariab le,

the

derivative,

and

the

It is an
partial

claiming that which properly belongs to the invariable, the
integral, the whole.

This, Augustine believes, is inappropriate,

because it is a form o f self-aggrandizement which he finds in
himself and describes in C onfessions 10:36.
to Isaiah

Therein, alluding

14:13-14, Augustine objects to self-aggrandizem ent

because it leads to o n e’s being “proud of his wicked end
achieved.”

However, he does succeed in this discussion in

establishing the basic position, that humans have a rational
element in their nature and that this element derives from a
God Who is rational specifically because He does not change.

Irratio n ality

Augustine
irrationality.

presents

concerning

human

In the first argument, in Citv of God

11:21,

Augustine describes

two

arguments

“ G od’s . . . unchangeable

w ill.”

In

C o n fe s s io n s 4:15 he “concluded that in goodness there was
unity.” Augustine finds also that “the disunion consisted of
irrational life . . . .

and was the natural state of the ultimate
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evil.”

He continues by describing him self as “changeable" or

variable.
my God.”

He addresses God as “your unchangeable substance,
Thus Augustine sees changeableness or variableness

as the ultimate source of evil.

This evil often manifests itself to

Augustine as “irrational life” or “discord.”

This disunion or

variableness “leads to crimes of violence and [to] the lust that
leads to sins of passion.”

A u g u stin e ’s

second

arg u m e n t

concerning

human

irrationality is based on his experiences with the Manicheans,
as described in C o n fessio n s 5:3.

The fundamental doctrine of

the Manicheans was that the principles of Good and Evil have
continuously existed.
and Darkness.

The principles are also known as Light

According to this doctrine, the Evil invaded the

Good and captured part of it.

Therefore, the material universe

is composed of a mixture of these principles, which are in
continuous conflict.

In contrast to the astronomers and mathematicians, the
Manicheans could not make rational predictions, and could not
give a convincing explanation for the philosophical positions
which they took (C o n fessio n s 5:5).

Augustine could find “no

reasonable explanation” for the M anichean position, and what
w as

e x p la in e d

“ P resum ption,”

he

he
also

fo u n d
calls

“ e x tre m e ly
these

ideas,

in c o h e re n t.”
and

says

that

M anichean doctrines are “repugnant and should be entirely
rejected.”

Augustine thus concludes that their doctrines are
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irrational

and

not

applicable

to human

needs.

In

this,

Augustine dem onstrates that human nature has a significant
element of irrationality.

Human Nature

In C o n fessio n s 4:15, Augustine states that “m an’s mind is
not the supreme good that does not vary.”

As set forth there,

A ugustine’s position is that the supreme good is invariable.
The ultimate good therefore is invariable, unchanging, unitary,
and

rational.

By

contrast,

the ultim ate evil

changing, multiple, and irrational.
of capital importance:

is

variable,

This establishes a principle

the variable things could not be variable

were there not a great invariable against which to measure
them.

Thus variables of human existence can be evaluated or

measured against a fixed, invariable coordinate.

Augustine

continues with this theme, and relates it to human happiness in
On Free Choice of the Win 2:19 wherein he states that “the
happy life, that is, the disposition of a soul that cleaves to the
unchangeable good, is the proper and principal good for a
human being.”

In C o n fessio n s 4:15, Augustine is careful to establish the
ultimate source of evil.

He says that

“I loved the peace that

virtue brings and hated the discord that comes of vice.

From

this I concluded that in goodness there was unity, but in evil
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disunion of some kind. It seemed to me that this unity was the
seat of the rational mind and was the natural state of truth and
perfect goodness; whereas the disunion consisted of irrational
life . . . .
sam e

and was the natural state of the ultimate evil.”

view

perspective.

has
In

been

developed

The Nicomachean

[1 1 3 8 ^ 3 5 -1 1 3 9 ^ 2 2 ])

from
E thics

a

The

non-C hristian

6:2, Aristotle (138

presents a broadly similar argument:

“There are two parts [of human nature] which grasp a rational
principle — one by which we contemplate the kind of things
whose originative causes are invariable, and one by which we
contemplate variable things.”
invariable

principles

is

an

Thus the idea of variable and
old

one,

and

of the

greatest

importance in human affairs.

Augustine, continuing in C onfessions 7:16, defines evil, or
wickedness, as a “perversion of the w ill,” a natural inclination
for “things of the lowest order,” that is, for vice and corruption
of every sort.

In mentioning “the lowest order” he also clearly

includes that which is harmful or injurious to persons and to
society, and that which leads to suffering.

Augustine thus

conceives of evil as more than morally wrong behavior or
wrong attitudes which produce wrong behavior.

In C o n fe ssio n s
evil.

10:36, Augustine identifies the result of

It is the “enemy of our true happiness.”

This principle or

personage wants Augustine “to divorce my joy from the truth. .
. . to enjoy being loved and feared, not for [God’s] sake, but in
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[His] place.”

That is, he wants to usurp the place of God.

Thus

when Satan revolted against God, as described in Isaiah 14, it
was the revolt of the variable against the invariable, of the
changing against the constant, or of the particular against the
universal.

An attempt on the part of the variable to alter the

invariable, or to actually displace or become the invariable, is
the ultimate insult to God.

This enemy wants to place Augustine in “the bonds of
com m on

punishm ent”

( C o n f e s s io n s

destroy Augustine’s happiness.

10:36)

which would

Augustine calls this principle

evil because it leads to a departure from the invariable God,
the Truth, toward the variable, the false.

For Augustine, and

for mankind, a departure from invariables and from truth is
necessarily

a

departure

from

true

happiness

and

tow ard

misery and degradation.

A ugustine

b eliev ed

th at

human

nature

necessarily contains a significant element of evil.

th erefo re
In On F re e

Choice of the Will 3:17, he states that “a perverse will is the
cause of all evils.”
humans.

This perverse will originates in the first

Augustine summarizes in Citv of God 14:13, “Our first

parents fell into open disobedience because already they were
secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had
not an evil will preceded it.”

In C o n fessio n s

1:7, Augustine

describes the results of an intrinsic evil will, giving as examples
the attempts of infants to strike and hurt others, and jealousy
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in a baby.

Augustine writes, “[i]f babies are innocent, it is not

for lack of will to do harm, but for lack of strength.”

This is

another way of saying that babies are not innocent at all, but
naturally

selfish and given to degradation and evil.

automatically incline toward jealousy and violence.
can make the same observations.

to

A ugustine

be

C o n f e s s io n s

Rather, children must be

good, a not insignificant task

concludes

his

Any parent

To train children to be bad is

not necessary; that comes naturally.
trained

They

discussion

of

in

sin fu l

this day.
infants

in

1:19 by mentioning that “these same passions

remain with us while one stage of life follows upon another.”
Human evil as a continuing inward condition, Augustine would
teach us, is a lifetime problem, as indeed it was for him.
problem for the saintliest persons.

It is a

The Apostle Paul, writing in

R o m an s 7:15, finds, “That which I do I allow not: for what I
would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.”

Paul relates in

R om ans 7:21, “when I would do good, evil is present with me.”

Augustine provides a second illustration of human evil in
his personal experience with theft.
from a nearby vineyard.

As a youth, he stole pears

He did so, not because he was in want

of food, but for the pleasure of “doing something that was
forbidden” (C onfessions 2:4).

He strongly condemns himself for

this desire to perform a forbidden act purely because it is
forbidden.

A ugustine

concludes

that

there

are

persons,

including himself, who would commit evil acts simply for the
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pleasure of it.

It is human nature, part of the natural order of

things resulting from a departure from the invariable.

Augustine sets forth a third example of the degraded
human condition in C o n f e s s io n s 2:5.

This regards murder,

regarded in every culture and at every time as evil.
com m it

murder

for

m any

reasons,

claims

One may

A ugustine,

example for the desire for a victim’s property or wife.
or

revenge

are

two

add itio n al

motives.

for

Robbery

Observation

of

contemporary news media confirm that human nature has not
changed since Augustine’s time.

However, Augustine asks if

one might commit murder for nothing but the pure delight of
killing.

In effect, he answers the question in the affirmative in

C onfessions 6:8 when he describes his friend Alypius’ visit to a
gladiatorial contest.

T here is no question that the Roman

authorities had arranged

for men to kill each other — to

commit evil acts — for no other reason but the pleasure which
it might afford to those who cared to watch.

There is no

difference in the human condition today, as is shown by boxing
m atches,

which

often

lead

to

serious

injuries

and

death.

Several years ago, I read a sociological survey which concluded
that upwards of 80% of people who attend the Indianapolis 500
motor races do so in hopes of seeing a fatal accident.
recent

cinematic

works

feature almost continuous

offered

for

public

entertainm ent

violence and bloodshed.

gladiatorial combats of old

and

Numerous

As the

the modern entertainm ents

appallingly demonstrate, people will pay for the opportunity to
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take pleasure in killing.

This predilection toward killing for

pleasure leads to unpleasant results in the international arena,
because

human

nature

necessarily

drives

national

behavior

(Keohane 201).

Original Sin

A ugustine ascribes these evil activities to a universal
state of evil

known as original sin.

Augustine’s conception is

shown in C o n fe s s io n s 7:21, where he quotes R o m a n s 7:23.
Therein the Apostle Paul complains that he is a “captive to that
disposition tow ard sin.”

Paul clearly

understands that this

innate disposition results from a departure from the invariable
because

he

mentions

in

R om ans

1:23

that mankind has

“changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image
made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted
beasts, and creeping things.”

Paul, like Augustine, gives the

result in G a la tia n s 5:19-20, which reads in the King

James

B ib le . “Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are
th ese;

ad u ltery ,

fornication,

u n clean n ess,

lasciviousness,

idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife,
seditions, heresies.”

A ugustine

further

acknowledges

C o n f e s s io n s 1:7 by asking,
innocent?”

this

m oral

state

in

“where or when was I . . . ever

He would reply to his own question that he was
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never innocent.

He asks in C onfessions 9:1,

that I have not willed to do?”

“what evil is there

There is no such evil as to lie

outside of Augustine’s will, nor, he would say with the Apostle
Paul, anyone else’s.

The Human Condition

Evil Is Normal

A u g u stin e

has

clearly

esta b lish e d

from

personal

experience and from observation of others that humankind is
given to an intrinsic moral depravity.

Humans, for example,

easily com m it murder for sport or pleasure.

The inescapable

conclusion is that war is a normal state of human affairs.
Augustine might quote

M atthew 24:6-8 in which Jesus Christ

says, in pertinent part, “. . . . ye shall hear of wars and rumors
of wars . . . nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom
against kingdom .”

This is exactly the view of Keohane and

other modern political Realists.

Keohane (p. 201) writes that

“the evil inherent in man is at the root of war and conflict.”

Other recent authors reach the same conclusion.

In his

book The Profession of Arms. General John Hackett mentions,
“From the beginning of man's recorded history physical force,
or the threat of it, has always been freely applied to the
resolution of social problems” (9).

In The Decline of the West.
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Oswald Spengler comments on the universality and brutality of
war, as does John Farrenkopf in a more recent work.

William C. W estm oreland commanded for several years
the American military forces in Vietnam.

He found, as did 1,

that war brings out the w orst in human behavior.

In his book

A Soldier Reports, he writes with anguish that
When 1 learned o f irregularities, 1 directed a
re le n tle s s
in v e s tig a tio n .
T h at
d is h o n e s ty ,
immorality, and other irregularities have occurred
in all wars was no excuse. Although 1 had hoped
that Vietnam w ould be an exception and had
worked hard to that end, it followed the pattern.
What is the answer?
Is human nature so fallible
that even the best efforts inevitably fall short?
(285)

The General’s observations, my personal experiences, as well as
the testimony of A ugustine and Paul show that human nature
is

indeed that fallible, and even more so. 1 was a young

lieutenant in the Corps o f Engineers stationed at Ft. Benning,
Georgia, during the time that Lieutenant William “Skip” Calley
was on trial there for his alleged actions regarding the alleged
massacres at My

Lai,

occasional duty station

V ietnam .

My living

quarters

w ere only a few blocks

building in which the trial took

place.

It was

from

and
the

a sobering

experience, the memory o f which will remain with me for a
lifetime.

Incomparably m ore memorable were the shocking

experiences concerning human depravity which awaited me a
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year later
so ld iers

in Vietnam,
and

d irec ted

where I commanded
sm all-u n it

operations under combat conditions.

a platoon

m ilita ry

of

engineering

General W estmoreland’s

comments are telling; he would have human beings observe
and practice morality, but, as he and 1 found, they “inevitably
fall short,”

In Just War. Political Realism and Faith. Bernard Adeney
comments on Augustine’s views concerning human nature and
war.

Augustine, Adeney summarizes, saw war as a fact of life.

He attempted to unite the very rigorous demands of Christian
love with a penetrating understanding of political realities and
with a very pessim istic view of human nature.

A basic

principle of the Augustinian view, according to Adeney, is that
the soldier must be authorized to commit acts of war; he must
not act on his own (28).

To use the phrase of John Rist in

Augustine. Ancient Thought Baptized, the soldier or politician
must never act with “absolute freedom of choice” (292).

This is

the Augustinian basis of separation of powers and of checks
and balances in modem political theory and of the Augustinian
Christian just war theory.

Irrational Exercise of Evil

In C o n fe s sio n s

10:36, Augustine mentions a difficulty

which he had not overcome even after years of effort as a
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Christian.

Following the evil principle or personage, “it is the

desire to be feared or loved by other men, simply for the
pleasure that it gives. . . ”

Augustine finds that, “when men

hold certain offices in human society, it is necessary that they
should be loved or feared by other men.”

This is a direct result

of the previously mentioned desire on the part of the variable
to

d isplace

the

invariable.

A ugustine

acknow ledges

his

variableness in C o n fessio n s 10:17 when he asks, “What is my
nature?

A life that is ever varying, full of change.”

This

variableness is the essence of the human experience.

From that fact, because of their inclination toward evil,
and because of the irrational aspect of humanity, it is clear that
some

humans

are

likely

to exercise evil

in

an irrational

manner, perhaps to further their own variable needs for selfaggrandizement.

Over history, many have done so.

Ghengiz

Khan, Adolph H itler, and a dreary list of other irrational
personages in world affairs provide examples of what irrational
persons tend to do when they need not answer to a higher
authority.

These persons are irrational because they do not

“rejoice in the truth,” as Augustine says in C o n fessio n s 10:23.
Rather, they rejoice in their own variableness.

They “wish to

deceive, but [not] to be deceived.” Such unstable men will stop
at nothing; hideous suffering and millions of deaths are of no
im portance to them.

By Augustine’s analysis, for example,

Saddam Hussein would clearly be regarded as an irrational
actor in

that he has used chemical weapons

on his
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countrymen and kinfolk, simply for the pleasure of killing or of
being

feared.

possible.

O ther,

One shudders

unimaginable,

m otivations

to think what actions

are

also

the natural

inclinations of Adolph Hitler or Saddam Hussein would lead to
with a nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it.

Augustine

knows. In On Free Choice of the Will 1:8, he describes “human
attributes . . . such as the love of praise and fame, and the will
to power.

When that drive [for such things] is not subject to

reason, it makes us wretched.”

In Cl tv of God 1:30, Augustine relates the experience of
the Romans after they defeated Carthage and thus could aspire
without restraint to R ist’s “absolute freedom of choice.”
Certainly your desire for peace, and prosperity, and
plenty is not prom pted by any purpose of using
these blessings honestly, that is to say, w ith
moderation, sobriety, temperance, and piety;
for
your purpose rath er is to run riot in an endless
variety of sottish pleasures, and thus to generate
from your prosperity a moral pestilence which will
prove a thousandfold more disastrous than the
fiercest enemies. It was such a calamity as this that
Scipio, your ch ief pontiff, your best man in the
judgment of the whole senate, feared when he
refused to agree to the destruction of C arthage,
Rome’s rival;
and opposed Cato, who advised its
destruction.
He feared security, that enem y of
weak minds, and he perceived that a w holesom e
fear would be a fit guardian for the citizens. And
he was not mistaken: the event proved how wisely
he had spoken. For when Carthage was destroyed,
and the Roman republic delivered from its great
cause of an x iety , a crowd of disastrous evils
forthwith resulted from the prosperous condition of
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things. First concord was weakened, and destroyed
by fierce and bloody seditions; then followed, by a
concatenation of baleful causes, civil wars, which
brought in their train such m assacres, such
bloodshed, such lawless and cruel proscription and
plunder, that those Romans who, in the days of
their virtue, had expected injury only at the hands
of their enemies, now that their virtue was lost,
suffered greater cruelties at the hands of their
fellow-citizens. The lust of rule, which with other
vices existed among th e R om ans in more
unmitigated intensity than among any other people,
after it had taken possession of the more powerful
few, subdued under its yoke the rest, worn and
w earied.

In short, the Romans, directly they had freed themselves from
the restraint imposed by an

international

system, made themselves wretched.

balance-of-power

Augustine’s is a strong

argument in favor of a balance -of -power international political
regime and against schemes of one world government.

In

Augustine. Ancient Thought Baptized. Rist comments on this
dolorous condition to the effect that
A ju st consensus has been reached that one of
Augustine’s great strengths is his power to observe
and document the disastrous and terrifying results
which come about when men, singly or in groups,
are able to grasp at absolute freedom of choice.
Intellectuals once dreamed — and persuaded others
to dream — that with the development of improved
social and educational c o n d itio n s, the moral
behavior of individuals would likewise improve. On
such a view the history of twentieth century Europe
should have been one o f m oral progress and
enlightenment.
The SS, the concentration camps
and gulags, not to speak o f the millions of the
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aborted and the callousness towards the starving
‘Third World’ have demonstrated the shallowness of
that kind of optimism. Augustine’s sombre account
of the workings of the ‘earthly city’ looks far more
challenging than it did to the eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century liberal, who thought he had
outgrown Hobbes’ similarly ‘Augustinian’ account of
the state of ‘nature.’ In particular, in this century,
we have seen star instances o f an Augustinian
libido dom inandi. of a sheer lust for power at its
crudest: “power,” said Goering, “is my fist at your
throat.” (292)

Use of Nuclear Weapons

In C onfessions 10:23, Augustine expresses his conviction
that, “[w]e cannot therefore be certain that all men desire true
happiness, because there are some who do not look for jo y in
[God].” Of course, there are those who do not look for joy at all.
These persons are unhappy
closely to other things

“because they attend far

more

whose power to make them unhappy is

greater than the power of their dim memory of truth to make
them

happy” (C o n f e s s io n s

10:23).

These “other th in g s”

typically are fame, desire for approval of others, desire to be
feared as Augustine mentions, all rooted in variableness and
evil.

It is human nature.

Augustine would warn us that there are certainly a few
such

individuals who

nuclear

weapons

to

would

use the very great

pow er

of

make

mankind unhappy.

T his,

as
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Augustine wrote in C o n fe ssio n s 4:15, would be the result of
“evil disunion” and “irrational life.”

It is an expression of the

fact that mankind is “changeable.”

Thus these persons are

inconstant, variable, and evil (Evans, 1991).

Augustine could

well quote Jam es 1:8: “a double minded man is unstable in all
his ways.”

Therefore, proliferation of nuclear weapons to

those nations, groups, or individuals deemed likely to use them
irrationally,

or as

a result

of their

own

unhappiness,

is

destabilizing in international relations and is contrary to the
interests of all nations and persons.

THE JUDEAN SOLUTION

Augustinian Philosophy of Salvation

A ugustine’s solution

to the basic problem

of human

depravity and evil is that offered by the Judean philosophers
and theologians from Job and Abraham to the Apostles Paul
and John.

In C o n fe ssio n s 7:9, Augustine describes his encounters
with

the

w ritings

of

the

Platonists.

These

philosophers

described God as powerful, desirable, worthy of respect.

These

philosophic ideals include the concept that God created the
visible universe;

that humankind has a relation to God, but is

not divine; and that humankind is estranged from God.
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philosophy, standing alone, Augustine finds to be inadequate
although it identifies the basic human condition.

It provides an

inadequate concept of God and represents an inadequate moral
base to guide human behavior because it does not propose a
solution to the problem of sin.

It provides no method by which

variable, evil hum ankind may approach God, the Truth, the
source of union and invariableness.

In the Christian philosophy, on the other hand, Augustine
finds a satisfying

solution

to the problem

of sin and of

estrangement from God; he finds a guide to ethical and proper
human behavior.

In C o n fe s sio n s 7:9 he pointedly mentions

that in the Platonic writings he does not find that God came to
live

with

hum ankind,

thereby

identifying

mankind’s difficulties, as set forth in Jo h n

H im self

1:1-14.

with

He finds

absent from Platonic philosophy the profound idea in R o m an s
5:6 that God, in the person of Jesus Christ, “underwent death
for us sinners.”

Thus did Augustine come to understand that

mankind has a deadly malady, a terminal disease resulting
from

having

difficulty is
problems.

offended
the

and

source,

disobeyed

God,

the root cause,

and

that

this

of all m ankind’s

God had resolved the difficulty by Himself enduring

the prescribed penalty, death, on behalf o f any who would
personally appropriate it.

This idea is very old and was

described about 2000 BC in Job 19:25 and in Jo b

33:22-30,

which suggest that God would provide a redeemer to pay a
price for the sinner’s faults.
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The solution

therefore,

as

A ugustine saw it, was to

appropriate to himself, or personally
sacrifice already made.

give assent to,

the

Addressing God in C o n fessio n s 8:12,

Augustine proclaims, “You converted me to yourself, so that I
no longer . . . placed any hope in this world but stood firmly
upon the rule of faith.”

This simple word “faith” — carrying the

ideas of trust and personal appropriation of an invariable gift
from the invariable God — is the essence of the Christian’s
personal assent.

It is what makes one a Christian.

Augustine’s assent to God’s solution permanently changed
his life.

Having been redeemed by the price that God had paid,

Augustine wrote “ [I] had no intention of offering myself for
sale” (C onfessions 9:2).

He began to live life on a higher plane,

understanding that all things, all
existence, derive from a deity

benefits, indeed his very

that Augustine could respect

because He had voluntarily addressed the human need.

This is

one aspect of “contemplating truth” or of rejoicing in truth.

It

is a somewhat similar ideal to that of Aristotle’s that one “can
contemplate truth” as described in The

Nicomachean

Ethics

10:7-8 (264[1177a22]).

This was a new world view.

God died on behalf of

humankind, an act which has not been emulated before or
since.

Therefore by individual imputation of that righteous act,

humans have the potential to regain their original standing of
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worth and dignity.

In theology, imputation is the act whereby

God ascribes, reckons, or attributes the goodness of the Savior
to the believer, that is, to the person who gives his assent or
trust.

The continuing Christian position is that a perfect Person

stands

in

thereby

the

stead

affirm ing

of

the self-adm itted

to each individual an

im perfect

intrinsic

dignity, and a standing of respect before others.

ones,

worth, a
They have

that ultimate dignity and worth because God has reckoned to
them His Own dignity and worth.

God ascribed His own

invariableness to individual men and women.

Human beings,

now creatures of value, are not to be harmed, or abused in
body or mind — certainly not atom bombed — for light reasons
or at the whim of any variable irrational person or group.

To

do so to them is to do so to God, the ultimate invariable. Who
stood and continues to stand in their moral stead.

The effect of this view has been historically unique and
the consequences are profound.
— and better

The world has been a different

— place since thecrucifixion

and resurrection.

The late Georgetown University professor of history Carroll
Quigley, in his landmark modern history Tragedv

and Hope.

points out that no philosophy, creed or doctrine, at any time in
human history, respects individual

people and regards them as

having dignity, intrinsic worth, and rights as does Christianity.
He points out

that the continuing

results o f

Christianity have

been love, humility, social concern, hum anitarianism , brotherly
care,

future

preference,

personal

clean lin ess,

com passion.
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o b lig a tio n ,

and

p a rtic u la rly ,

attem p ts

destructiveness and misery of war (1120).
T h e re ,

theologian

Francis

to

lim it

the

In The God Who Is

Schaeffer continues

this

theme,

pointing out that “the source of a real care for people a s
individuals comes from biblical Christianity” (45, emphasis in
original).

A Non-Christian Perspective

Leading philosophers and political scientists of different
eras who represent philosophical outlooks very different from
Augustine’s have nevertheless followed a sequence of thought
similar to Augustine’s and have reached a similar conclusion.
Their foundational conclusion is that human beings have a
worth and that that worth is to be respected.

Sun Tzu reasoned

from a non-Christian perspective; Marcus Aurelius was clearly
hostile to Christianity.

Both men addressed the problem of

human worth and societal worth as it relates to humankind’s
basic evil inclination.

Reasoning from a secular rationalistic

viewpoint, Immanual Kant has also addressed the issue.

These

philosophers may disagree with Augustine as to the source of
human worth, but the basic conclusion is that human beings
are not to be harmed for nothing.
approach within a diversity

This uniformity of basic

of philsophical presuppositions

suggests that the Realistic view is neither new nor outmoded
but, rather, that it is a constant and a truth.
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Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu is thought to have lived between about 500 B.C.
and 300 B.C.
and skill.

He was a military commander of great renown

During his lifetime, the region now known as China

consisted of a number of contending states.

Oswald Spengler

has likened the situation then existing in China to that in the
Classical world between the times of Alexander and Caesar,
when

several states were contending

for supremacy.

For

twenty years. Sun Tzu commanded the military forces of the
Kingdom

of Wu

in

a

successful

com bination

of brilliant

diplomacy and parsimonious military action.

Sun Tzu united a vigorous realistic view of international
politics with a firm sense of moral values.

“The true object of

war is peace,” he wrote in The Art of War (7), in complete
agreement with Augustine’s views on just war.

Therefore Sun

Tzu maintained effective military forces ready for instant use,
but preferred to further the interests of the Kingdom of Wu by
means of diplomatic initiatives and devious stratagems.

“True

excellence,” Sun Tzu writes, “is to plan secretly, to foil the
enem y’s intentions . . .

so that at last the day may be won

without shedding a drop of blood” (20).

This rational approach

Sun Tzu devised for two reasons: first, to avoid imposing upon
the people of Wu the ruinous costs of war in blood and treasure
and, second, to preserve civil tranquillity.

These are both
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qualities of great moral value and reflect Sun Tzu’s underlying
concept that the people of Wu have worth and that that worth
is to be respected.

This respect is to be extended to the enemy,

in Sun Tzu’s view.

Sun Tzu describes the results of extended

m ilitary cam paigns; taxation, untended crops,
family values, and excessive loss of life.
believes,

are

best

avoided

when

disruption of

These things, he

p o ssib le

and

otherwise

minimized, agreeing exactly with Augustine’s views of the evils
of war.

Sun Tzu advocated a highly developed espionage system.
It is

the ‘‘height of inhumanity,” he

intelligence functions to save money.

w rites,
T his

to

minimize

is because the

expenditure of a relatively small amount o f money and effort
for espionage typically yields great savings in military costs,
and in lives (77).

When w ar cannot be avoided, the correct action in Sun
Tzu’s moral view is to wage it as rapidly and effectively as
possible.
delays.

“Cleverness

has never been

asso ciated

with long

There is no instance of a country having benefited

from prolonged warfare,” he writes (13).

This wise approach

minimizes the necessity for long conscriptions and high taxes; it
also minimizes casualties.

These are high moral values, and

Sun Tzu appears as a humanitarian leader concerned with and
solicitous of the soldiers under his com m and and with the
population at large, including the soldiers and population of the
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enemy.

As Osgood describes in Ideals

and Self-Interest

in

America’s Foreign Relations, this is the epitome of the Realistic
moral position, respecting the realities of international affairs
and also respecting the moral values which characterize the
best of human life (442).

For Sun Tzu, the hard imperatives

deriving from considerations of national survival subserve the
higher moralities of a peaceful, productive and livable civil
society.

He takes this position entirely from his respect of the

worth of the people of Wu, as would Augustine.

Marcus Aurelius

Reasoning

from

non-Christian

presuppositions,

M arcus

Aurelius (A.D. 121-180) reaches the same conclusion as does
Augustine in the fifth century.

As emperor of Rome, Aurelius

directed the affairs of the empire, including a war in Parthia,
and he personally
against
system.

the

commanded several major military efforts

G erm anic

tribes

then

endangering

the

Roman

An adherent of the Stoic philosophy, he can in no

manner be considered a personal Christian or an adherent o f a
Christian world-view.
C hristianity.

As

Indeed, he was somewhat hostile to

tim e

allow ed,

he

wrote “The

M atters

Addressed to H im self,” a record of personal thoughts
insights now known as M e d ita tio n s .

and

As a result of Aurelius’

many duties and civic obligations. M e d ita tio n s has a certain
disjointed character.

It does, however, provide a sufficient
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basis from the Stoic philosophy to reach the same conclusion
regarding nonproliferation which Augustine would reach.

In M e d ita tio n s . Aurelius appeals repeatedly to reason
in much the same way as does Augustine.

“Intelligence and

Reason make their way through every im pediment,” Aurelius
writes in M editations 10:33.

In Aurelius’ Stoic philosophy, this

reason exists to guide one through life:

“From living according

to the reason of thy nature no one can prevent thee,” he writes
in M editations 6:58.

Aurelius also perceives an evil and irrational aspect of
humankind.

In M ed itatio n s 7:70, he describes “worthless men

who are what they are and so many.”

In M e d ita tio n s 9:42, he

reflects
When thou art offended by shamelessness in any
one, put this question at once to thyself: Can it be
then that shameless men should not exist in the
world? It can not be. Then ask not for what can
not be. For this man in question also is one of the
shameless ones that must needs exist in the world.

Thus for Aurelius it is inconceivable that humans should not
behave

in a shameless

or wicked

manner.

He describes

“unbridled arrogance” in M editations 11:6 and “pomposity and
pride” in M e d ita tio n s

9:29.

These comments

agree with

Augustine’s treatment of human behavior in Ci tv of God 14 and
in On Free Choice of the Will 2:18 where he writes that “we fell
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voluntarily.”

Aurelius

and

A ugustine

significantly

never

exclude themselves from their own caustic remarks.

Applying the principles of rationality leads in Aurelius’
Stoic thought to three general principles for guidance to action.
These

are,

first,

an “uncompromising

inclinations” (M e d itatio n s 7:55).
self-control.

resistance

to bodily

This is the essence of Stoic

Second, Aurelius finds civic duty.

“The rational is

indisputably also the civic,” he writes in M e d itatio n s 10:2.

He

concludes that he should behave so that his “present work is
that of a living creature, intelligent, social, and under one law”
(M e d ita tio n s

8:2).

The third principle is human worth, the

same conclusion that Augustine reaches.

Human beings have

worth, Aurelius writes in M editations 9:1, because
the Nature of the Universe has fashioned rational
creatures for the sake of one another with a view to
mutual benefit based upon worth, but by no means
for harm. The transgressor . . . acts with obvious
im piety.

Aurelius summarizes his position in M e d ita tio n s

11:18.

First, human beings “came into the world for the sake of one
another.”

That is, humans have rationality and worth.

some humans will behave irrationally and evilly.
rightly, then it is obviously . . .

through ignorance.”

Second,
“If not

Third, such

persons must be corrected, for their own good and for the good
of the civic weal.

“When a chance is given, exhort him mildly

and, at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm,
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quietly teach him a better way,” with the least violence and
harm possible.

A national leader has a moral obligation to do

this because, as Aurelius writes in M editations 11:18,
To expect the bad not to do wrong is worthy o f a
madman; for that is to wish for impossibilities. But
to acquiesce in their wronging others, w h ile
expecting them to refrain from wronging thee, is
unfeeling and despotic.

This is the essence of the nonproliferation argument.

Immanuel Kant

Taking a rationalistic approach rather than a Christian
one,

Immanuel

K ant

developed

in

G roundw ork

of

the

Metaphvsic of Morals an argument which supports a conclusion
similar to that of Augustine and Aurelius.
shortcoming on the part of the human race.

Kant finds a

“If we look more

closely at our schem ing and striving, we everywhere come
across the dear self, which is always turning up,” he writes
(75).
claims.

This is the natural state of humankind, as Augustine
Kant also notes that the results are “extremely bad and

hurtful when the will is not good” (61), which agrees with
Augustine’s treatment of the will in On Free Choice of the Will.
Kant proposes to remedy this defect by an appeal to duty, as
defined by law.

“ Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence

to the law,” Kant states (68).

He then establishes that one
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should “never act except in such a way that [one’s] maxim
should become a universal law” (70).

That is, one should act in

such a manner as one would desire everyone to act.
the term “maxim” to mean “principle.”

Kant uses

“Every rational being,”

Kant writes, should be about “making universal law” (100).

Kant’s precept is exactly applicable to the problem of
nonproliferation.

He repeatedly uses the term “worth” (65, 69)

as applied to human beings and describes “our very worthiness
to be happy” (61).

He would contend that human beings have

worth and should not be atom bombed for irrational reasons.
Informed, rational persons are devising a treaty — literally a
universal law in the Kantian sense — to achieve that end.

C om m entary

Knowing that some would likely use nuclear weapons
irrationally if they had them, Augustine would expect us to use
our rationality to limit the destruction and misery of war. An
inappropriate and irrational response would be to do nothing
or to take action which would be less than fully effective.

He

would conclude that the rational thing to do is to keep nuclear
weapons out of the control

of irrational

parties or those

deemed likely wantonly to use them.

Augustine views laws as

the

be

means

by

which

this

should

accomplished.

In

C onfessions 3:7, he writes, “This is the law by which each age
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and place forms rules of conduct best suited to itself,”

Thus

Augustine encourages the modem world rationally to establish
laws relating to the acquisition, use and testing of nuclear
weapons, and by logical extension, to enforce those laws.

From these considerations, the Pope in medieval times
forbade the use of crossbows in Europe.
War

to

Bonaparte,

mutual consent.
European

European

From the Thirty Years’

w arfare

was

constrained

From the Concert of Europe in 1815

society,

acting

on

averted most potential wars.

A ugustinian

by

to 1914,

presuppositions,

Latterly, efforts have been made

by means of the Geneva Convention to forbid poison gas and
soft-point bullets in warfare.

The Kellogg-Briand pact is an

attempt, naive as it may have been, to outlaw war itself.
Whatever the p act’s efficaciousness, the attempt results from
the

p erv asiv e

m o ral

p rin c ip le ,

based

on

C h ristian

presuppositions, that war should be curtailed or eliminated to
the

extent

possible,

as

Adeney

describes

(30).

These

overarching moral principles are active even in most of those
who view themselves as outside the Christian faith.

It is from

precisely that moral position that the West now attempts to
control nuclear weapons and to forbid their use, as is shown by
numerous appeals for a global moratorium on nuclear weapons
testing.

The nuclear powers are thus seen to be protecting the
interests — the happiness — of their own citizens as well as
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those of humanity in directly opposing proliferation of nuclear
weapons to certain parties.

Morgan and Wallerstein write that

“constraining such developments is morally defensible” (298).
As Augustine writes in C o n fessio n s 12:25, quoting I Timothv
1:8,

the nuclear powers are “ ‘apply[ing] the law legitimately,’

that is, to the end o f charity.”

The charity which Augustine

describes is love, concern, a desire for well-being, rightfully
exercised toward all mankind.

International
expression of

peace-keeping

this concern.

treaties

are

Any treaty

an

appropriate

is a law between

sovereign parties, and Augustine clearly establishes that such
laws are needful and appropriate.

In C onfessions 3:7, he writes

of “the law by which each age and place forms rules of conduct
best suited to itself.”

He continues by establishing that “justice

[is not] erratic or variable, but . . . the times over which it
presides are not always the same, for it is the nature of time to
change.”

In C o n fe s sio n s 3:8, Augustine continues to develop

the principle,
foreigner,

that “no one, whether he

may,

to

suit

his

own

is

a native or a

pleasure,

v io late

the

conventions established by the customary usage or the law of
the community

or the state.” To do such

a thing, Augustine

continues, is “out of keeping with the whole.”

One such treaty to be discussed in this report is the
Comprehensive T est Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has the basic
purpose of preventing

or hindering

the spread

o f nuclear
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w eapons

technology

and

ca p ab ility .

throughly approve of such a treaty.

A ugustine

would

Implicit in the Treaty is a

recognition of the human need for right and orderly living.
Throughout The God Who Is There, theologian Francis Schaeffer
contends that humankind cannot function without an adequate
conception of morality and that this morality must have its
basis in absolutes.

B ib le s .

A ugustine’s C o n f e s s io n s

and

A ristotle’s E thics, for example, sell well because of the human
need for ideals and for right principles for living.

Human

nature demands nothing less and the CTBT rightly addresses
the need.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty recognizes human
nature as Augustine envisioned

it.

It recognizes that the

unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to lead
to tragic results, given humankind’s irrational, self-agrandizing
nature.

Therefore, the Treaty attempts to limit the spread of

information and testing capability which would lead to nuclear
weapons proliferation.
A ugustine

establishes

This is entirely
in

A g ain st

appropriate because

F au stu s 22:75 that the

“natural order which seeks the peace of mankind ordains that
the [national leaders] should have the power of undertaking
war . . .

in behalf of the peace and safety of the comunity.”

Thus Deutch’s notion (133) that use of a nuclear weapon would
constitute a valid casus

belli

has the strongest support in

Augustinian moral philosophy.
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CHAPTERS

THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

The Emergency Management and Nonproliferation
Division (EMND), acting under standing directives, provides
generic treaty support to the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DoE)
Nevada Operations Office (NV) and to Department of Energy
headquarters.

This section o f the study exam ines the

background and provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). It compares the present functions of the EMND
under the existing Threshold Test Ban Treaty with its
anticipated required functions under the new Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty.

There are many sim ilarities which can

support the new effort, as well as some differences which
req u ire

a tte n tio n .

This

sectio n

c o n c lu d e s

w ith

recommendations concerning a redefinition of roles for EMND
in v o lv em en t

w ith

and

support for

DoE’s Office

of

Nonproliferation and National Security, and for changes to
provide the desired support.

60
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ETHICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS

Attempts along Augustinian lines, and other attempts, to
preserve the peace and to ameliorate the negative effects of
war have a long history.

Humankind has attempted to develop

religious or ethical constraints against war, to outlaw it, and to
create codes and councils for peaceful arbitration of disputes.
Common also have been attempts to restrict the development
or use of various weapons.

An early

attem pt at unilateral arms

about 1100 B.C.

control occurred

The Philistines imposed on the Israelites a

policy restricting access to iron for weapons and tools.

This

policy put the Israelites at a significant disadvantage. (I S am uel
13:19).

In a somewhat later age around 750 B.C., the author of

Isaiah 2:2-4 presents a universal peaceful polity as the ideal of
a future age.
he writes,

“They shall beat their swords into plowshares,”

“N either

shall they learn

war anym ore.”

The

ancients also attem pted to mitigate the more brutal aspects of
war. In The Republic. Plato quotes Socrates in about 450 B.C. as
decrying the use o f poisoned weapons and poisoned water in
warfare.

Thus at an early time arms control proponents held

peace as a desirable state, attempted to preserve the peace,
and attempted to reduce the suffering and brutality of war
when it did occur (Taylor).
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Medieval

attem pts

at

arms

purposes were also common.

control

for

hum anitarian

In the 900’s the Peace of God

attempted to impose rules of war.

In the lOOO’s the Truce of

God attempted to control or eliminate war in Europe.

In 1139,

Pope Innocent II prohibited the use of crossbows in Europe, an
early attempt at arms control and nonproliferation (Taylor).

Arms control agreem ents
modem times.

were also common in more

In 1609, Hugo Grotius’ treatise On the Law of

War and Peace proposed a ban on the use of poison.

In 1817,

the Rush-Bagot Agreement between the United States and the
United Kingdom successfully dem ilitarized the Great Lakes.
From

1899 to

1907, the

Hague Peace Conference banned

excessively destructive small-arms ammunition and poison gas
from warfare.

In 1928, the United States and France initiated

the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war as an instrument of
national policy.

Eventually 63 nations acceeded to the treaty.

Many of these attempts were of limited effect, but that
does

not detract from

the

valid

ethical

and hum anitarian

principle that controlling arms and eliminating war insofar as
possible

are

proper

efforts

for

mankind.

With

modern

capabilities in monitoring and inspection, the potential benefits
conferred to humankind by arms control and nonproliferation
efforts seem to be well worth the considerable effort involved
(van der Vink and Park).
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INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN NONPROLIFERATION

The Nonproliferation Treaty of 1971

From

the beginning of the nuclear era, the need to

prevent the spread of nuclear w eapons was evident.

If a

growing number of nations were to obtain nuclear weapons, or
if terrorist or subnational groups were to obtain them, the risks
of nuclear war would greatly increase.

Such a war could occur

as a result of accident, or by unauthorized use by a renegade
official

in

an

otherwise responsible

escalation of a regional conflict.

nuclear power,^ or by

The possession of nuclear

weapons by many nations would add a serious new threat to
peace (Mazari, 1992).

Rapid development of nuclear weapons

by the Soviet Union (Cochran, 1989), United Kingdom, France
and China made it apparent that many nations were capable of
mastering nuclear technology.

Other developments

em phasized

the

danger.

By the

1960’s, advances in technology enabled the operational use of
nuclear power plants.

The nuclear reactors of these plants

produce plutonium as a by-product.

This plutonium can be

chem ically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons (Perkovich, 1993; Panofsky, 1994).
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A cting

on

an

unstated

A ugustinian

m oral

basis,

worldwide initiatives sought to control proliferation of nuclear
weapons.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 had as one of

its main purposes inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons.
The international effort continued, culminating in 1970 in the
ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) provides, in pertinent
p a rt:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
u n d ertak es not to tran sfer to any recip ien t
w hatsoever nuclear w eapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in
any way to otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not
to seek or receive any assistan ce in the
m anufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.

The

1970 NPT contains

a provision

that it will

be

reviewed and renegotiated after having been in force for 25
years.

The renegotiation convention thus authorized met in
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April 1995, considered necessary revisions, and renewed the
NPT.

Kenneth N. Luongo points out that many non-nuclear
weapons states have considered continued weapons testing by
the nuclear weapons states to be a serious impediment to
improving nonproliferation efforts. The NPT extension has been
deemed of critical importance to U.S. security policy; and a U.S.
com m itm ent

to

the

CTBT

is

thought

necessary

to

gain

international acceptance of the NPT extension.

United States Interest in Nonproliferation

The national interest of the United States is to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nations which presently
do not have them.

This policy is thought to contribute to

international stability

by reducing the risk of nuclear war

(Bundy, Crowe and Drell).

According to Anthony Lake, certain

“backlash” states behave in a non-cooperative manner and are
deemed to be candidates for nonproliferation measures.

For

example, Iran and Iraq exercise policy-driving ideologies which
are hostile to U.S. interests.

A nuclear Iraq or Iran, bordering

the Persian

supplies,

G ulf petroleum

would be particularly

dangerous to U.S. interests and goals in the region (Lake; Pipes
and Clawson).
conventional

Michael T. Klare has described an accelerating
arms

race

in East Asia and

Southeast Asia.
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Ideological differences, potential

border disputes and trade

disputes have the potential to develop into armed conflict.
E d w ard

L u ttw ak

has

d e s c rib e d

p a rtic u la rly

conventional border warfare in South

America.

vicious
If nuclear

weapons exist in East and Southeast Asia and in South America,
the potential exists for their use.

The United States’ trade and

political interests are therefore likew ise served by an ongoing
worldwide policy of nonproliferation.

In a speech to the United N ations General Assembly,
September 27, 1993, President Bill Clinton said,
I have made nonproliferation one of our nation’s
highest priorities.
We intend to weave it more
deeply into the fabric of all of our relationships
with the world’s nations and institutions. We seek
to build a world of in creasin g pressure for
nonproliferation, but increasingly open trade and
technology for those states that live by accepted
international rules. . . . We will pursue new steps to
control the materials for nuclear weapons. . . . The
United States has also begun negotiations toward a
comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

President Clinton thus acknowledges an Augustinian Realistic
view

of

human

“increasing

nature

p ressu re,”

and

national

p ro liféran t

behavior.

p artie s

would

W ithout
clearly

continue to pursue their goals, to the detriment of all persons.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67
John D. Holum, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, emphasized this national commitment in an August 4,
1994, speech to the Conference on Disarmament.
The United States seeks a CTBT that will bring an
end to all nuclear explosions — period.
No
thresholds. No exceptions. And by that I mean not
just ail explosions, but all states. Success demands
in particular the full support and participation of all
five n u clear weapons states.
And w e seek
universal adherence.
Of course the United States and the other nuclear
weapons states bear a special responsibility in this
negotiation, and of course we also have special
ex p erien ce and know ledge th at can aid it
considerably. So we will continue to work closely
with the other nuclear weapons states to propel this
effort toward fruition.

Holum's remarks also contain a strong Augustinian element.

By*

the Augustinian argument set forth herein, the United States
and other nuclear weapons states do indeed “bear a special
responsibility” in an ethical sense, to attend to the issue of
nonproliferation, and to do so in an effective manner.

Congressional Mandate

N onproliferation
Congressional interest.

has

long

been

a m atter

of

intense

After extensive debate. Congress passed

the Prevention and Control of the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act of 1993.

That Act expresses Congress’
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belief and concern that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a
serious threat to international peace and also to U.S. national
security.

The A ct identifies the Department of Defense, the

Department of Energy, and various intelligence organizations as
possessing unique capability with regard to the
d etectio n and m onitoring o f p ro liferatio n of
weapons of mass destruction . . . and carrying out
in tern atio n al m onitoring and inspection regimes
that relate to proliferation of such weapons.

The Act directs the relevant agencies to
maintain and improve their capabilities to identify,
m onitor, and respond to the p roliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems
for such weapons.

Congressional and Presidential authority thus exist for
the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department of Defense
and for the Department of Energy to conduct operations in
various ways relating to nonproliferation.

These operations

consist prim arily of monitoring, on-site inspections, research
relating to improving capabilities, and the implementation of
research

re s u lts

for

nonproliferation practice.

im p ro v em en t

of

the

a g e n c ie s'

The Department of Energy’s Nevada

Operations Office (NV) has a major authority and responsibility
in relation to these functions.
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International Legal Concerns

The

basis

of

the

m odern

international

system

of

sovereign nation-states is the Peace of W estphalia of 1648.
That Peace ended a cycle of wars, including the Thirty Years’
W ar, and definitively superseded
theory

included a group

a prior system which in

of nations

whose legitimacy

existence depended on ecclesiastical unity and authority.

and
The

new system recognized no secular authority higher than that of
the sovereign nation.

The present basis of international law

lies in the system of treaties which those nations concluded to
address mutual concerns.

The United States

C onstitution, A rticle I,

Section 8,

authorizes Congress to “define and punish . . . Offenses against
the Law of Nations.”

This has been taken as an obligation to

interpret and apply international law, in accordance with the
Augustinian view of law set forth in C o n fe s s io n s 3:7-8.
addition, according to Article VI,

In

treaties are to become the

“supreme Law of the Land, and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby,” indicating a foundational commitment to
international credibility and to international law.

Any treaty may conceivably conflict with federal statute.
Because treaties are part of the “supreme Law of the Land,”
conflicts are resolved in the same manner as between two
federal statutes.

Courts attem pt to interpret the words of
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conflicting

federal statutes in such a manner that they are

consistent.

However, if a contradiction is so profound that it

cannot be resolved, the courts will generally conclude that the
more recent of the two laws was intended implicitly to amend
the earlier.

Thus, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty could conflict
w ith

fed eral

law s

environm ental
w hich

on,

for

exam ple,

com pliance (Tanzman

have

extensive

and

requirem ents

following of specific procedures.

h ealth ,

safety

H affenden

for

perm its

or

III-29),
and

the

Because any inspection on U.S.

territory must be in compliance with all applicable laws, this
could

becom e

inspecting

a fertile field for ju d icial

entity

zealous in proceeding

action

w ith

were the

an inspection

without the necessary permits and legally required procedures.
The

U nited

S tates’ interests are

best served

by

EMND’s

identifying the safety and other regulatory lim itations which
apply and developing plans for dealing with them in the event
of a challenge inspection in U.S. territory.

National Rights

A sovereign nation may be defined as a political entity
w hich

m aintains

order

w ithin its

own borders.

recognize

any

political

and

protection

against

lawlessness

At present, m ost nations do not
entity

higher

than

or

of

greater
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authority than themselves, or if such a recognition exists, it is
very limited.

Nations maintain relations among themselves by

means of diplomacy and treaties.

Sovereignty encompasses the

principle that a sovereign nation need not, and in most cases
will not, permit foreign entities to conduct operations within its
borders.

However, there arise in the international arena situations
w herein

n atio n s

have

surren d ered

a

portion

of

their

sovereignty to achieve some perceived desirable goal or for the
common good.
A ntarctic
perception

T reaty

Such a situation prevailed in 1961 when the
was

negotiated.

that a system

There

then

existed

o f m ultilateral inspections

a

would

effectively demilitarize the Antarctic continent and that such a
demilitarization would be beneficial to all parties.
inspections

have

been executed,

A number of

and no violations

of the

Antarctic Treaty have ever been discovered (U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency).

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) is another example
wherein two nations, the U.S. and the then-U.S.S.R., perceived
that a regime of bilateral inspections would serve the mutual
interests.

Each nation agreed to permit the other to perform

limited inspections of its own nuclear weapons test program.
Thus, each nation gave up a measure of its sovereignty for the
common good.

This attitude of mutual cooperation for the

common interest reflects the Augustinian position regarding
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laws.

“Human codes of conduct vary according to . . . custom,”

he writes in C o n fessio n s 3:8, otherwise, “the common interest
would suffer.”

In the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the
inspection
im posing

scheme

is

significantly

more im m ediately

signatory States Parties.
parties as excessive.

upon

more intrusive,

thereby

the

of

sovereignty

the

This may be perceived by some
However, Edward Lacey (1992)

has

pointed out that
Verification
of com pliance w ith the obligations
imposed by
anarms lim itation and disarm ament
agreement is an activity conducted by the parties to
an arms limitation and disarmament agreement or
by an organization at the request and with the
explicit consent of the parties, and is an expression
of the sovereign right of States to enter into such
agreem ents.

Thus participation in the regime created by the CTBT is
entirely voluntary,

to be entered into only by States Parties

which perceive that some benefit thereby accrues to them and
to the international system as a whole.

Because there is a

seemingly universal desire to ban nuclear weapons testing and
an equally strong perception that the CTBT would be effective
to that end, the new regime is viewed positively by the officials
of many nations.
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Individual Rights

W ithin the U.S. Department of Energy, concern has been
expressed regarding the Constitutional rights o f U.S. workers
who m ight be interviewed during an
CTBT.
U .S.

inspection

under the

This concern centers on the Fifth Amendment rights of
citizen s

ag ain st

self-incrim ination.

P otentially

an

“interview ” by a supranational Organization would contravene
the w orkers’ Constitutional rights.

This is a very serious concern.
and Protocol dated
concern.

However, the draft Treaty

10 April 1995 partially

addressed this

The draft Protocol, Part 5, Paragraph 39.3 states that

The inspected State Party shall be under the
obligation to allow the greatest degree of access,
taking into account any constitutional obligations it
may have with regard to proprietary rights or
searches and seizures.

It is not clear that this provision adequately
immediate concern.

addresses the

In the United States, detailed resolution of

this critical and sensitive issue will likely be completed in the
courts.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty m ust comply with
the Constitution in every respect. After a treaty is ratified, it
becomes the “Law of the Land.”
treaty

violates

Constitutional

However, to the extent that a
rights,

the

treaty

cannot
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enforced on U.S. territory.

A challenge inspection on U.S.

territory could be proposed for federal property, state lands or
private

property.

In the case of a challenge inspection proposed for private
property, the Fourth Amendment rights of the property owner
would become a major issue.

If the owner is a natural person,

such as a farmer, the U.S. government could exercise em inent
domain.

That, however, requires time-consuming due process

whereas the CTBT envisions a rapid on-site inspection.

If the owner is a corporation, such as a mining company
whose underground workings are suspected by the inspecting
entity of having hosted a weapons test, the situation becomes
more complicated.

A warrant would of course be necessary.

However, to perform a seismic investigation or a drillback
operation at a working mine, it might become necessary to shut
down operations of the mine.

This would cause most o f the

mine workforce to be laid off for a lengthy time, resulting in
hardship to workers and families, adverse impacts to the local
community, and cessation of tax revenue to the state in which
the mine is located.

These issues of Constitutional rights should

be addressed and planned for before ratification of the treaty.
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Intrusions Affecting National Security

Within the U.S. Department of Energy, concern has also
been

ex p ressed

inspection.
excessively

At

regarding
the

zealous

n atio n al

Nevada
inspection

Test

se cu rity

S ite,

team

for

may

seek

under

an

exam ple,

an

to

observe

facilities and equipment which do not relate to the CTBT but
which are a sensitive national security concern.

The draft Treaty and Protocol dated
somewhat w eaker in this regard than
prefer.

10 April

1995 seems

U.S. officials

might

The Protocol, Part 5, Paragraph 39.3, provides that

The inspected State Party has the rig h t under
managed access to take such m easures as are
necessary to protect the national security.

This provision seems to contain
regarding

security

interests.

“m anaged

access”

is

the

“necessary” to protect U.S.

One
only

a potential difficulty
naturally

m easure

security

w onders

deem ed

interests,

to

if
be

or if other

measures would be acceptable under the CTBT.

Of specific concern

is the issue

o f overflights.

An

overflight of the Nevada Test Site as part of a challenge
inspection could reveal classified inform ation from areas not
under immediate suspicion of nuclear weapons

testing.

A

second issue of concern is that of excessively intrusive general
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inspections

conducted

The N evada

T est

under authority of com bined

Site,

and probably

other

treaties.

sensitive

U.S.

facilities, could experience a symbiotic vulnerability resulting
from such m ultiple-treaty inspections.

Information gained in

this manner could compromise national security.

Safety

Safety

of U.S. workers affected by the CTBT is an

important legal issue.
particularly

In the United States, worker safety,

as regards radiation safety, has been a critical

issue for decades.

Some other nations do not have nearly as

great a regard for workers’ well-being.

The issue then arises

concerning what safety standards the Organization should use.
The

In tern atio n al

Atomic

Energy

A gency,

for

exam ple,

doubtless has safety standards, but they do not pertain to
safety of inspectors investigating a potential nuclear weapons
test site.

It is not clear, as of this date, what safety standards

would prevail in the Organization, how they would be applied
in a deployment, and how the standards might affect inspection
effectiveness.

An additional area of uncertainty is that of legal

liability for injuries experienced by a U.S. citizen while on an
inspection,

or by a foreign inspector injured at a U.S. site.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO A CTBT BY 1996

H istorical Development

The United States has a long history of commitment to
and support for international control of nuclear weapons and
for a concomitant ban on testing.

In March 1946, only eight

months after the first nuclear weapons were used in combat,
the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was released (Rhodes 765).

That

report envisioned the creation of an international authority to
control nuclear weapons and to control the materials used to
make them.

In a consultancy report, Timothy J. Pounds shows

that the hypothetical authority then envisioned would conduct
extensive and highly intrusive on-site inspections to enforce a
control regime.

The Acheson-Lilienthal Report thus reflects the

United States’ concern for arms control early in the nuclear era.

Based on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, the U.S. proposed
in June

1946 the Baruch Plan which intended to establish

international control over all nuclear activity (Moynihan 113).
The Plan would have obligated all nations to surrender all
nuclear activities to an
unlimited inspections.

international agency and to

accept

This international agency would have

reported violations to the U.N. Security Council for prescribed
responses.

The Soviet Union rejected this ambitious plan,

thereby initiating an international competition to acquire ever
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more effective

nuclear weapons

in

increasing

numbers

as

Richard Smoke and Kosta Tsipis describe.

T im othy

J.

Pounds

describes

how

development

surface testing of fission and fusion weapons proceeded.

and

Public

awareness and fallout levels increased, and the outlines of the
nuclear weapons debate became apparent.

In December 1954,

a U.S. test in the Pacific exposed personnel to radiation.

In

another incident, rain containing radioactive material from a
Soviet test fell on Japan.

The public and experts began an open

debate on whether to stop testing.

Advocates of a test ban

claimed that health risks and security risks resulting from a
continuing arms race could not justify ongoing testing.

Testing

supporters argued that a test ban w ithout credible verification
provisions would be unfeasible and that continued testing was
necessary to deter Soviet aggression.

Concern for a credible and dependable way to ban testing
was

apparent,

continued.

and

international

concerns

about

testing

The governments of Japan and India called for

inquiries concerning testing or tem porary bans.

The United

Kingdom called for a U.S. — U.S.S.R. summit to suspend testing.
Pope

Pius

X II

expressed

concern

fo r

the

dangers

continuing nuclear arms race and advocated disarmament.

of a
In

1955, Secretary of State John F. D ulles responded to these
sentiments when he stated that the U.S. could not then find a
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solution which would be “both dependable and in the interests
of the United States.”

A fter numerous atmospheric tests and much public and
internal debate, the United States, the Soviet Union and the
United Kingdom began comprehensive test ban talks (CTB) in
1958.

A moratorium on testing was in effect from 1958 to

1961, when the Soviet Union resumed atmospheric testing.

In

1961, while the talks were in progress, then-President John F.
Kennedy visited the Nevada Test Site.
for continued

testing

to establish

He recognized the need
weapons

reliability

and

favored conducting the tests underground rather than in the
atmosphere.

He also favored retaining the skills o f the nuclear

scientists and established a nuclear rocket research program
partially

for

that

purpose.

A fter

extensive

negotiation,

including a Soviet refusal to consider on-site inspections, the
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) went into effect in 1963. The
LTBT banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space and under water.

At President K ennedy’s insistence,

underground tests were permitted, but the parties could not
agree on a verification scheme.

Verification remained the most

important and complex issue concerning a test ban.

The parties

could not agree to a system of controls and inspections, and
considered sim ple pledges to be dangerous to

security and

therefore inadequate. The U.S. position continued to be that on
site inspections would be required to make a test ban credible
(Eimer and Drell; Lacey).

As a closed society in the Cold War
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context, the Soviet Union resisted all such inspections except
voluntary ones.

In 1970, the Nonproliferation Treaty entered into force.
In early 1974, the Soviet Union proposed a threshold test ban
wherein nuclear w eapons tests would have been lim ited in
yield.

Later that year, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed a

bilateral Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).

The new scheme

departed from previous proposals by setting a yield ceiling of
150 kilotons
magnitude.

rather

than

a threshold measured

in

seismic

The TTBT also envisioned an end to all weapons

testing as an ultimate international goal.
geographic boundaries of test areas.

A Protocol delineates

The Protocol also provides

for the exchange of technical data, for the exchange of geologic
information on the test sites, and for the exchange of data from
two calibration test shots at each site.

N eg o tiatio n s

fo r

a

com plete

test

ban

continued.

Throughout the 1980’s, Congressional support for a test ban
continued.

In 1987, the U.S. and the Soviet Union began talks

in Geneva on TTBT verification issues.
that further lim its
national interest,
regim e

under

the

The U.S. position was

on nuclear testing would not be in the
but

a precedent-setting

TTBT

was

eventually

on-site

inspection

developed.

comprehensive test ban was viewed as a long-term objective.
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However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War have created a perception that, to some degree,
this very condition now obtains, and that a comprehensive test
’ ban is now attainable.
m ade statements
ban.

By 1991, more than 60 nations had

supporting a near-term

comprehensive test

Most statements cited the end o f the Cold War and the

test ban’s link to stopping the arm s race and to promoting
nonproliferation.

During the 1992 presidential election, both

m ajor political parties made a CTB part of their respective
platforms (Leach, 1992; Hamilton, 1992).

Present Policv

The present U.S. policy is one of complete support for a
com prehensive
m onitoring

and

test

ban

verification

(C TB )

th a t

includes

p ro v isio n s.

During

extensive
the

1992

presidential campaign. Bill Clinton’s position was that a CTB
would subserve American efforts

to prevent proliferation of

nuclear weapons to other countries.

In

1993, during the

Vancouver Summit, President Clinton reaffirmed his campaign
pledge to obtain a CTB and announced the beginning of a
consultative process with Russia, China and the United States’
allies aimed at starting CTB negotiations.

In January 1994,

negotiation for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began
in Geneva.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82
In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly of September
27,

1993, quoted above. President Clinton articulated

three

guiding principles regarding U.S. nonproliferation policy.

They

are, first, nonproliferation is accorded highest priority and is
integral in relations with all nations.

Second, the U.S. will seek

expanded trade and technology transfers to build international
security.

Third, the U.S. expects to build an international

consensus to integrate nonproliferation and economic goals.

Several specific

and relevant nonproliferation

derive from these guiding principles.

policies

Primary among them is

an activist approach which seeks to achieve com pliance with
nonproliferation goals by monitoring.

In addition, the U.S.

seeks an indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty
(N PT),

and

seeks to ensure that the

International

Energy Agency (IAEA) has resources for safeguards.

Atomic
The U.S.

also seeks to strengthen and improve IAEA’s ability to detect
undeclared

nuclear facilities.

The U.S.

prom otes

regional

nonproliferation initiatives, with special efforts in Korea, the
M iddle East, and the South Asian Pakistan-India area.

(U.S.

Department of Energy, undated).

Policy Impact on the U.S. Department of Energy

T hese

national

Department of Energy.

policies

have

im plications

for

the

As a nonproliferation norm, the DoE is
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to

support

IAEA ’s

developm ent
n u clear

ability

activities.

terrorism

and

to

d etect

Inform ation
sm uggling

clandestine
exchange

of

weapons

to

com bat

fissionable

nuclear

weapons materials is also a high priority.

Present political considerations recognize a shift from a
U .S.-Soviet bipolar emphasis to a nonproliferation policy more
oriented toward regional considerations (U.S. Department of
Energy).

This emphasis includes use o f DoE nuclear experts and

DoE country-specific nonproliferation experts.

DoE expects to

apply expertise developed in the DoE weapons complex during
the Cold War to regional problems.

These efforts include treaty

v erificatio n

pro v isio n

e x p e rtise

and

im plem entation,

during

cap ab ility ,

and

treaty

n eg o tiatio n s,

environm ental

of

technology

system s

m onitoring

and

analysis

rem ediation

technology as applied to weapons test sites.

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CTBT

Many nations have sought a complete ban on the testing
of nuclear weapons.

Concerns about proliferation, the breakup

of the Soviet Union, the recent experience with Iraqi nuclear
weapons development, and Russian and U.S. moratoriums on
testing

have

led

to

an

international

clim ate

wherein

an

effective ban is perceived to be both politically possible and
technically feasible.

Times have fundamentally changed in this
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regard.

Augustine writes in C o n f e s s io n s 3:7 that “it is the

nature of time to change,” and that it is the place of humankind
to “prescribe and apportion [laws and measures] according to
the needs of the times.”

Although testing is not a strict technical necessity to
develop nuclear weapons, the conference held in 1995 on the
extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has heightened
the

perception

of

the

need

an d

appropriateness

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
central

issues

declared

included

continued

nuclear weapons

states,

of

a

In the NPT conference,

nuclear

testing

asym m etries

by

the

between

the

nuclear and non-nuclear states, and multinational involvement
in the monitoring and com pliance evaluation process.
particular

interest

has

been

the

in ab ility of the

Of

current

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) inspection provisions to
ensure detection and identification

of clandestine efforts to

develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

Recent events in Iraq and

in

North

Korea

have

d em onstrated

that concerns

about

proliferation and about effective counterproliferation measures
are well founded. Thus the international community views the
CTBT

as

an

important

and

indispensable element

in

extension of the NPT.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the

85
Background to the CTBT

Negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
began in Geneva in January 1994 under the auspices of the
U nited

N ations

Conference on Disarm am ent.

Sweden

and

A ustralia each submitted their own versions of draft treaties.
After discussion and negotiation, the participants produced a
draft treaty on 10 April 1995.

In Part 2, “Scope,” the draft

CTBT provides that
Each [State Party]
[of the Parties to this Treaty]
undertakes [to prohibit, and to prevent, and] not to
carry out, [at any place and] [in any environment,]
any nuclear weapon test [explosion]
[which
releases nuclear energy] [in any form or any type],
or any [other]
nuclear [test]
[explosion], [and
u ndertakes to prohibit and p rev en t any such
nuclear explosion] at any place [under [or beyond]
its jurisdiction or control] [.] [:]
[(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including
outer space; or under water, including territorial
waters or high seas; or (b) underground.]

The peculiar style of this draft Treaty is known as a Rolling
Text and is intended to convey all of the alternate wordings
under consideration.

This Draft is considerably stronger than

that of a previous Draft dated 05 Septem ber

1994, which

contained the significant provision
[, with the exception of any explosions which may
be authorized in exceptional circumstances] [.] [;]
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Thus the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as envisioned in the
draft of 10 April 1995, is a “convention [intended to] establish
. . .

the customary usage or the law of the community or the

state,” regarding use of nuclear explosive devices, as Augustine
writes in C o n f e s s io n s
Treaty

would

be

3:8. Generally, each signatory to the

prohibited

weapon test explosion.
explosions, including

from

executing

any

nuclear

This complete prohibition of all nuclear
peaceful explosions and research

explosions is to be the “customary usage.”

test

By this Treaty, the

signatory States Parties, acting for the human race, intend to
ban nuclear w eapons

explosions.

A

major

elem ent

of

Augustinian ju st war theory is that human activities should
have peace as a goal (Langan 174).

This Treaty attempts to

approach that goal.

New International Organization

To achieve the stated goal, the draft CTBT establishes an
entity which it names as the Organization.

The draft also

establishes a Conference of States Parties and an Executive
Secretariat, each with specific functions.
a

Global

M onitoring

System

whose

It further establishes
purpose

is

to

detect

evidence of any nuclear explosion.

The

O rg an izatio n

monitoring and inspections.

exists

to

conduct

in tern atio n al

The Organization is also to provide

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87

a forum for consultation and cooperation among the signatory
States Parties.

The Organization is to consist of the Conference

of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical
Secretariat which is to include an International Data Center.

The Conference of the States Parties, composed of one
representative of each signatory State Party, is the governing
body of the O rganization

and makes recommendations

and

decisions on questions which any State Party or the Executive
Council may raise.

The Conference exists to review and to

ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

It also

addresses measures to “redress and remedy any situation that
contravenes the provisions of the Treaty.”

The Executive Council consists of representatives of those
States Parties which were nuclear-weapons States Parties to
the Nonproliferation Treaty, and other members which serve in
rotation for two-year terms.

Responsible to the Conference, the

Executive Council resolves

ambiguous events

by means of

information exchanges and by challenge on-site inspections.
The Executive Council also receives and implements requests
from States Parties for on-site inspections.

The Technical Secretariat assists the Conference and the
Executive

Council

inspections.
creates

as

the

agency

empowered

to

conduct

It is that element of the CTBT regime which

maximum

c re d ib ility

and

which

provides
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im m ediate

deterrent

to

a

nation

or

group

which

would

otherwise desire clandestinely to test a nuclear weapon.

The

T ec h n ica l

and

S ecretariat

also

n e g o tia te s

agreem ents

arrangem ents relating to monitoring and inspection activities.
A major function of the Technical Secretariat is to operate the
International Data Center as part of the Global Monitoring
System .

The Global Monitoring System will conduct in a mutually
c o m p lim e n ta ry
m onitoring,

and

su p p o rtiv e

m anner

monitoring of radionuclides

in

seism o lo g ical
the

atmosphere,

hydroacoustic monitoring at sea and infrasound monitoring in
the atmosphere (Conference on Disarmament, Evaluation).
gathered is transmitted to the International Data Center.

Data
Under

the CTBT, each States Party is to establish monitoring stations
and to provide the data obtained to the International Data
Center.

Each State Party has the right to receive all data

collected.

Seismological recordings have long been recognized as a
primary means of detecting nuclear explosions.
to

detect

recording

such
stations

an

explosion

depends

on

and on their distribution.

The capability
the

number of
The seismic

monitoring network must recognize a nuclear explosion from
among thousands of seismic events annually, which include
natural earthquakes and chemical explosions conducted during
mining and excavation operations. To be most effective, the
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recordings

from

the

global

network

must

be

transm itted

rapidly to the International Data Center (IDG) and analyzed in a
timely manner to be made available to the States Parties to the
CTBT.

The seismological recording scheme will need to reflect

these facts.

There are presently three different arrays of

seismic recording devices under consideration.
150

recording

stations

substantial cost.
seismic events,

would

These
and

be

A maximum of

deployed

on

land,

at

would detect, locate, and identify

would

transm it the data, possibly

by

satellite links to the IDC (Conference on Disarmament, Seismic).
For the most part, the seismic data would be made available for
scientific purposes (Monastersky 391).

A nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, or venting from
an

underground

n u clear

explosion,

releases

radioactive

particles and gases which are dispersed over a very wide area.
Depending on the location

of the test, the location of a

monitoring station, and on meteorological factors, the time from
detonation to detection of radionuclides can be a few hours to a
few

days.

The

differentiates

scale

of these

radionuclide

time-dependent detections

m onitoring

from

monitoring

for

shock or sound waves for which evidence of a test would
accumulate within minutes or hours.

However, radionuclide

analysis is of fundamental importance because it is the only
technique for the detection of radionuclides which result from
nuclear fission.

Detection of such radionuclides is very strong

evidence that a nuclear detonation has occurred.

Three options
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for a worldwide network of radionuclide monitoring stations
are under consideration, with a maximum of about 100 stations
envisioned

(C onference

Radioactivity;

on

Disarm am ent,

O ptions

.

.

.

Relevance).

A nuclear explosion in the oceanic environment creates
marine sonic waves which can be detected and located by a
suitably arranged network o f detectors.

In the case o f a

nuclear explosion which occurs near the surface of the sea,
hydrophones can detect the event although land-based seismic
detectors cannot do so.

If the explosion is fully contained, the

hydroacoustic method serves well in conjunction with seismic
means.

For shallow explosions, the hydroacoustic method is the

only method which can locate the event.

Three potential

deployment scenarios are currently under consideration, which
envision varying numbers o f hydrophones mounted in fixed
bottom

arrays

or

on

m oored

buoys

Disarmament, Options

. . . Hydroacoustic).

techniques

are

envisioned

submarines at

capable

(C o n feren ce

on

None of

the

of detecting

sea, an im portant

subm erged

issue to States Parties that

prefer that their submarines remain undetected.

Infrasound
detecting

and

microbarographs,
atm osphere

m onitoring

an

established

locating

nuclear explosions.

the

detects

resulting

instrumentation

is

m ethod
from

a

nuclear

sound

m ethod

of

means

of

By

waves

explosion.

in

the

M odern

can detect a nuclear explosion at distances
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greater than 1500 miles. Microbarographic stations can be co
located with seismic stations in most instances.
m icrobarographic

stations

are

en v isio n ed

About 100

(Conference

on

Disarm am ent, Infrasound).

Operations of the Organization

The CTBT authorizes the Organization to collect data, to
deposit that data in the International Data Center, and to
conduct on-site inspections in response to a challenge by one or
more of the States Parties.

Each State Party would have the

right to analyze all data which the International Data Center
may collect.

If any State Party believes that a nuclear weapons

test has occurred, that State Party has the right and the moral
obligation to request an on-site inspection of the suspect site.
The inspection would be conducted by persons designated as
inspectors by the Technical Secretariat.

The challenged State

Party is obligated to permit the inspection and to assist in its
execution.

Nationals

of

the

requesting

State

Party

may

participate in the inspection only as observers, according to the
current draft version.

The Antarctic Treaty of 1961 is an example of an early
arms

lim itation

inspections.

effort and

a precedent in

nonproliferation

By the Antarctic Treaty, all m ilitary activity,

including nuclear tests, is banned in Antarctica.

Each signatory
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has the right to inspect the Antarctic facilities of every other
signatory nation.

Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, the Soviet

Union and the United States have all exercised the right to
inspect.

The U.S. has conducted eight inspections, all of which

involved Soviet facilities.
nuclear

weapons

No military activities, armaments or

activities

have

been

observed,

and

all

scientific programs were in accord with published plans (U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990).

According to

all reports, the activities observed complied with the provisions
and the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty.

This experience provides

a model of cooperation for the CTBT.

Staffing and Activities of Inspection Teams

The
inspectors

States
to

Parties

to

the Technical

the

CTBT

Secretariat

provide
which

qualified

continuously

maintains a cadre of inspectors.

The inspectors would have

diplom atic

are executing

immunity when

they

their duties

within the territory or airspace o f a challenged nation.
Technical

Secretariat would

likely

be required

The

to maintain

equipment suitable to execute an inspection for all the sites at
which an inspection is likely to be required.

The equipment

would therefore be required to function under extremes of
tem perature, humidity and altitude.

The inspectors would

likely maintain, calibrate and service the equipment.
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The inspectors are required

to begin their inspection

within seven days of the time that a States Party requests it.
By the provisions of the CTBT draft of 10 April 1995,

Protocol,

Paragraph 39.5, the inspection is to include, as appropriate:

Topographic work and surveying
Visual observations
Photography and video imagery
Sampling of gas, soil, and liquids
Measurement of radionuclide activity
Seismological surveys
Magnetic, gravitational and thermal measurements
Drilling into the area of a suspected weapons test

These

activities

are

deemed

to

be

those

most

likely

to

determine if a nuclear weapons test has or has not taken place
at a particular site.

The envisioned inspections are significantly

more involved than those which U.S. and Soviet inspectors have
executed under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. They may also
in principle take place at any location rather than only at
established Soviet testing sites or the United States’ testing site.

The inspectors report their findings
Secretariat.

to the Technical

If the Organization believes that an unauthorized

nuclear weapons test has occurred, it reports that fact to the
United

N ations

Security

Council

for

appropriate

action,

including possible sanctions of various sorts, including military
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action.

This provision reflects the Augustinian position set

forth in C o n fessio n s 3:8 that “no one . . . may, to suit his own
pleasure,

violate

the conventions

established

by customary

usage or the law of the community or the state.”

Otherwise,

“the common interest would suffer.”

Deterrence and Credibilitv

Parties inclined to test nuclear weapons must believe that
their tests will likely be detected and that their activities will
face

in te rn a tio n a l

consequences.
opprobrium .

publicity,

w ith

sig n ific an t

negative

Such consequences would include international
U nited

N ations

san ctio n s,

responses by nearby and affected states.
are also envisioned (Deutch 122).

and

diplom atic

Military responses

These are the consequences

deemed most likely to deter clandestine testing of nuclear
w eapons.

Many scenarios are of course possible, but the most likely
one regarding a challenge inspection involves first a challenge
from one or more of the States Parties which suspect that a
nuclear weapons test has taken place.

The challenging States

Parties would specify a suspect area, which would be reduced
in size as additional information became available.

According

to the draft Treaty dated 10 April 1995 Protocol, Sec. 39.7 and
Sec. 39.8, at a suitably delineated suspect site, the Organization
would conduct visual observation, along with ground, airborne
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and

submarine

observation

photography

could

include

as

appropriate.

spectral

This

m onitoring.

initial

The

next

activity would be taking samples of gas, soil and liquids from
the

site

and

atm osphere

measuring

and

in

of

radionuclide

the ground.

activity

A dditional

in

the

investigation

intended to establish the presence of a cavity or chimney
resulting from a nuclear weapon test would likely follow.
investigation

could

include

seismological

m ethods,

Such
ground

penetrating radar, or other methods.

A drillback operation at the suspected test site is the
activity which potential testers would view as most credible.
The recovery of radioactive samples would provide conclusive
evidence that a test had been conducted.
operation

would

have

clandestine testing.

Such a drillback

the greatest deterrent effect against

The Organization would require such a

capability on a continuous basis.

Such a drillback is not without difficulties.

Heretofore,

U.S. authorities have conducted drillbacks as part of their own
testing

scheme.

However,

a drillback

conducted

by

the

Organization within the territory of a sovereign nation raises
novel issues.

Novel operational and logistical issues of interest to the
D epartm ent

of

Energy

include

protection

of

inspecting

personnel from radiation resulting from a poorly executed test.
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disposal of potentially
liability

for

completed.

or actually radioactive cuttings, and

environm ental

cleanup

after

the

drillback

is

In addition, issues arise concerning transportation

and disposal

of

contam inated

drill

parts;

and

ownership,

transportation, and disposal of a contaminated drill rig.

Such

issues would have to be addressed in the event of a drillback.

U.S. ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH THE CTBT

On-Site Inspection Agency

On January 15, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed a
Directive establishing the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)
and

authorizing

it

to

implement

the

on-site

inspection

provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Elimination of
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty).

OSIA was

then chartered as a Department of Defense agency on January
26, 1988.

Personnel from all military services, as well as civilian
experts and support personnel, permanently staff OSIA.

The

agency maintains close liaison with Executive Branch agencies
that are involved with the arms control and nonproliferation
processes.

Within OSIA, the Science Advisor is by Presidential

Directive a senior Department of Energy offîcial with expertise
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in

nuclear

weapons

testing.

The

Department

of Energy

provides other experts to OSIA in the conduct of its monitoring
and inspection operations in the Soviet Union. The Inspection
Operations Command perform s
M o n ito rin g

O perations

the

on-site inspections. The

C o m m an d

provides

co ntinuous

monitoring presence at form er fissile materials production and
assembly plants in Russia and the U.S.

On July

18,

1990,

P resid en t

George Bush

signed

a

Directive which authorized OSIA to conduct inspections in the
Soviet Union and to host Soviet inspections in the United States
under the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).
OSIA was thereby authorized to arrange for and to use DoE
nuclear testing experts and other scientific experts in seismic
yield

monitoring and hydrodynam ic

yield measurements

of

announced Soviet tests at N ovaya Zemlya and at Semipalatinsk
(W right,

1992).

These

fu n ctio n s

significantly less extensive than

are

different

from

and

those envisioned under the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
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Emergency Management and Nonproliferation
Division. Nevada Operations Office. DOE

Description

The

E m ergency

M anagem ent

and

N o n p ro liferatio n

Division (EMND) is an element of DoE’s Nevada Operations Office
(NV).

Its primary mission is to provide generic treaty support

to the Department of Energy, to the On-Site Inspection Agency,
and to other interested elements of the U.S. Government.
functions

under applicable laws and policies

to

EMND

implement

some provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).
A pplicable

N atio n al

Security

D irectives

management of TTBT monitoring activities

assig n

overall

to

On-Site

the

Inspection Agency (OSIA), an element of the Department of
Defense.

EMND

supports

OSIA

by

providing

technical

leadership and team members to conduct hydrodynamic yield
measurements and other on-site inspection activities in Russia.
EMND also serves to host Russian inspectors and visitors at the
Nevada Test Site.

DoE established EMND in 1989 and provides guidance to
EMND from the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
in Washington, D. C.
funding

allocations,

This guidance is provided by means of
written

program

guidance,

and

annual

planning exercises.

The EMND presently consists of about 30

federal

as

em ployees

well

as

contractor

em ployees
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scientists and other professional personnel in DoE’s National
Laboratory complex.

EMND functions under the supervision of

a Director who reports to the Assistant Manager for Operations
in DoE’s Nevada Operations Office.

The Director’s staff consists

of a Deputy Director, engineers, scientists and analysts, and
secretarial support.

These personnel are further divided into

two teams, the Emergency Response and Remote Sensing Team
and the Proliferation Response Team, each of which consist of
about a dozen professionals who function under the direction of
a team leader.

EMND

integrates

scientific,

logistical and operational

aspects of the DoE’s arms control and nonproliferation effort.
p ro v id es

e x p e rtise

in terp retatio n ,
physics,

in

p ro je c t

electronic

m ining

m anagem ent.

engineering,

engineering,

data

interpretation and Russian language services.
of State

has

continuously

relied

on

P ro to c o l

radiological

integration,

It

health

photovideo

The Department

EMND

for

technical

suggestions and assistance for a variety of missions involving
Russian visits to U.S. nuclear weapons facilities.

EM ND’s

technical and linguistic personnel provide training in Russian
nuclear

term inology

and

intelligence community.

usage

expertise

in EMND,

members

of

the

U.S.

EMND also participates in security

aspects of verification work.
the

to

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rely on
its

contractors

and the

N ational

Laboratories on questions of policy relating to international
nuclear weapons testing.
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The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and EMND coordinate
closely in developing verification methodologies and technical
applications

supporting

adopted by the U.S.

treaty

com pliance

measures

to

be

EMND provides all of the required support

for standard TTBT monitoring missions and cooperates with
DNA to develop nonstandard TTBT verification techniques.
EMND also cooperates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
to coordinate security measures for Russian nationals visiting
the Nevada Test Site.

EMND coordinates with the Advanced Research Projects
Agency to develop a deployable seismic verification system,
and participates with the Center for Seismic Studies to consider
developments in seismic technology.

Because the verification mission is technically complex, it
requires

close

coordination

betw een

scientists,

engineers,

personages in the policy community, and political leaders.

The

three National Laboratories, Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia;
the

U.S.

G eological

Survey;

EG&G/Energy

M easurem ent;

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc.; and Raytheon
Services Nevada have provided the necessary mix of technical
professionals.

EMND manages and coordinates these assets into

integrated teams which perform
m issions.

More than

one

the function of deployment

hundred

scientific professionals
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depend on EMND to gather information, plan, arrange training,
and provide technical leadership and logistical support.

Present Capabilities

The present capabilities of the EMND relating to weapons
testing treaties lie in the areas of support for Russian visits to
U.S. nuclear weapons facilities and in the areas of technical
support for the On-Site Inspection Agency regarding on-site
inspection of Soviet nuclear weapons tests at Novaya Zemlya
and at Semipalatinsk.

EW>fD

supports

discussions

and

negotiations

of

the

coordinating group of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
The Division conducts planning for Russian visits to U.S. nuclear
w eapons

test

facilities.

In

this

capacity,

the

Division

coordinates logistical and operational activities and arranges
for housing of foreign inspectors and visitors and also prepares
for the security and escort requirements.

The EMND has Russian language capability, including the
capability to translate Russian documents relating to nuclear
weapons technology.

EMND has hosted foreign visitors from

Russia, China, England, France and Yugoslavia.

EMND gained

significant experience with Russian visitors and Russian nuclear
weapons technology during the Joint Verification Experiment of
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1988.

A d d itio n al

e x p e rie n c e

N onproliferation Experiment, in

re s u lte d

w hich

from

the

nearly a kiloton

of

chemical explosives was detonated at the Nevada Test Site.

In the conduct of on-site inspections at Russian nuclear
weapons test sites, EMND supports the OSIA.
thus

gained

inspections.
developm ent

expertise

in

planning

and

The Division has
coordinating

for

EMND manages logistical support and research and
as

required

for

insp ectio n s.

The

Division

continues to provide Russian language capability for on-site
inspections, and to provide members to the on-site inspection
team .

NEW FUNCTIONS

The draft Treaty of

10 A pril

1995

authorizes

some

activities which are different from

those in which EMND

historically

has

T here

differences.

First, the Inspecting Organization would perform

been

involved.

any inspection, rather than OSIA.

are

five

major

Second, the inspection

activities could be performed at any location worldwide, rather
than only at declared nuclear w eapons

test sites.

Third,

inspections envisioned under the CTBT are more intrusive than
those executed under the TTBT.

Fourth, a CTBT inspection

would be performed with a notification of a few days, rather
than the months which are required under the TTBT.

Fifth, the

CTBT inspections are likely to be performed in an atmosphere
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of distrust if not outright hostility, although the United States
desires an atmosphere of benign fairness.

The D raft Treaty of 10 April 1995, in the Protocol,
Paragraph 39.5, makes provision for the following activities to
be performed during an on-site inspection.

These functions are

described below.

Topographic Work

T opographic

exam ination

and

m apping

w ould

be

performed for the purposes set forth in the D raft Treaty,
“determining the real coordinates of the inspection area and
the coordinates of points where measurements shall be carried
out in the area designated for inspection.”

This activity would

determine the location for further inspection activity.

Surveying would tie in measurement points,
points for geophones for geophysical measurements.
w ould

also

estab lish

locations

for

including
Surveying

seism o m eters

for

microseismic examination of a suspected cavity or chimney.
Leveling or use of tiltmeters would detect subsidence resulting
from collapse of a cavity or chimney.
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Visual Observations

Visual
cavity

observations would include attempts

or chimney

vulnerable

to

resulting

visual

from

exam ination

a weapons
are

surface

to detect a
test.
drilling

Also
and

emplacement equipment necessary to conduct an underground
test,

as well as test cabling and surface structures dedicated to

acquisition of test data.

V isual

observation would extend to standard geologic

mapping and sampling at a suspect site.
standard

fracture

mapping

and

search

In addition, non

for artifacts from a

suspected nuclear explosion would be included.

Photographv and Video Imagerv

Overflights and aerial photography would comprise an
essential inspection capability of the Organization.

The ability

to rapidly prepare aerial photographs and maps by automated
means and to compare them with previously existing data
would be an important method for initial evaluation of nuclear
test activity.

Such a capability on the part of the Organization

would carry

credibility

O rganization

would

in

need

the view
to

have

of many.
the

ability

Thus the
to prepare

photographs of fissures, subsidence craters and buried cabling
relating to weapons testing.

An ability to conduct aerial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105
magnetic and gravity surveys might reveal the presence of a
cavity resulting from a weapons test.

Aircraft mounted ground

penetrating radar would provide a rapid estimate of subsurface
conditions at a suspect site.

The Organization will require the capability to conduct
over-ocean reconnaissance to address those situations in which
a proliférant nation would
waters.

execute

a test in

international

Aircraft with the capability to take photographs and

perform real-time radiometric surveys would be necessary.

Sampling Gas. Soil and Liquid

Sampling and testing of soil for unusual heat flow and for
presence of volatiles resulting from a nuclear explosion would
also be conducted.

These volatiles include radioactive noble

gases and tritium, as well as stable gases such as €0%, CH^
H%.

Radioactive gases are most likely to be detected first.

absence of radiation, COj, CH^

and

and
In

H; are indicative of a

chemical high explosive detonation which could be detonated at
shallow depth as a cover for a nuclear explosion at greater
d ep th .
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Measurement of Radionuclide Activity

R ad io activ ity
detected

and

from

measured

in

the

weapon

to provide evidence

nuclear weapons testing.
m easurem ents

nuclear

debris

can

be

of clandestine

The Draft Treaty envisions “radiation
atmosphere,

underground, underwater.”

on

the

ground

surface,

A “spectral gamma survey” from

aircraft or submarines is also envisioned.

These activities are

necessary to detect the presence of radioactivity resulting from
a nuclear explosion.

Seismological Surveys

S eism ological
inspection scenarios.
energy

input

and

waves that result.
the presence

surveys

they

measure and

necessary

in

many

interpret

the

seismic

These surveys have the potential to detect

of a cavity

can

be

Most of these surveys use some source of

underground nuclear test.
input source

would

also

and chimney resulting

from an

Seismic surveys which do not use an
detect and measure

seism ic

signals

resulting from the collapse of a cavity or chimney.

M agnetic. Gravitational and Thermal Measurements

M agnetic, gravitational and thermal measurements reveal
other aspects

of a nuclear test.

An underground nuclear
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weapons test produces

large quantities of ionized

m aterial,

creates a large underground cavity, and emits heat into the
surrounding media.

M agnetic or electric prospecting

of a

suspect area may produce a signature indicative of a test.
Gravitational surveying may disclose the presence of a cavity
or

chimney

resulting

from

a

weapons

test.

T herm al

measurements may detect a thermal pulse resulting from

a

nuclear explosion.

Drillback Operations

The

drillback

operation

is

the

activity

credibility in the international environment.

of

g reatest

The ability of the

Organization to conduct a drillback at any suspected site on a
worldwide basis is the ultimate assurance of compliance with
the CTBT.

Carefully sited drilling at a ground zero location

would be likely to detect a cavity, rubble zone or chimney.
Samples of gas and rock core could be obtained,
increasing the credibility of the inspection process.
in-hole

geophysical

techniques,

sound

thereby

In addition,

measurem ents,

and

ground-penetrating radar techniques could also be performed.
Down-hole radiation measurements would be an autom atically
envisioned activity.

A drillback operation would entail

considerable logistics

effort

to move personnel, drill

a

pipe,

cement, mud, pumps and generators to the suspect site.

A

commercial drill crew

a

cannot be expected to drill into
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radioactive mass, so additional training would be required.
Radiation monitoring would be continuous.

Depending on the

scenario, with sufficient training and prior preparation, such a
drillback operation could be conducted in a few weeks with a
high probability of success.

Environmental issues arise concerning the disposition of
radioactive particles in the drilling mud and also concerning a
method

to reclaim the drill

radioactive drill components.

sites, as well as disposal of
In all of these activities, EMND

would have ability to provide technical expertise directly to the
inspection effort or to train others to perform the necessary
operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Under the

CTBT, EM ND’s functions would thus be

significantly different from those presently exercised under the
TTBT.

Under the TTBT, EMND supported OSIA in inspections

only in Russia or the United States. Under the CTBT, EMND must
support

U.S.

interests

w herever

they

relate

to

the

new

international Organization.

Concerns about proliferation and emphasis on the CTBT
change the technical monitoring focus of the EMND.

Heretofore,

EMND’s effort was primarily yield estimation of declared tests
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at two declared sites in Russia.

Hosting Russian inspectors at

the NTS has been an important additional mission.

Under the

CTBT, EMND’s mission would include backstopping exercises,
training, and support for a U.S. contribution to the Organization
or to a deployment.

Hosting inspectors in the United States

would be a continuing mission.

Comparison of EMND’s present capabilities and the tasks
that would be required of it under the CTBT show that
additional capabilities will be required.

Consideration of these

necessities leads to the following recommendations.

Enhance Use of EMND within
Nevada Operations Office

Because of valid delegations and long-standing expertise,
the

Em ergency

Management

and

N onproliferation

Division

should remain in Nevada as a unit of the Nevada Operations
Office. EMND can interact with DoE Headquarters units to
provide expertise in the development of a workable CTBT,
Protocol and implementation documents.

The implementation

documents are particularly important because they define the
details of an on-site inspection.
contribute in this function.

EMND is well-prepared to

In Nevada, the EMND would also be

well situated to support implementation of CTBT provisions
relating

to

establishment

of

the

O rganization

and

on-site
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inspection capabilities.

A Nevada-based EMND would be best

able to minimize intrusions and impact on U.S. activities at NTS
and to support Operations Security functions.

EMND is close to

the relevant contractors and National Laboratories and is well
situated to manage development of scientific systems for on
site inspections.

Reconfigure EMND to Reflect New CTBT

Under DoE

H eadquarters

guidance, EMND

reconfigured to reflect the needs of the CTBT.

should

be

EMND should

acquire new capabilities as the CTBT progresses through the
ratification process and as the Organization is established.

EMND

should

provide

expertise

for

U.S.

efforts

interpret data provided by the International Data Center.
implies that EMND

to

This

should maintain existing capabilities in

seismic technology and in detection of radionuclides.

EMND

should develop expertise in hydroacoustic m onitoring and in
infrasonic techniques.

EMND may support OSIA for inspections in the U.S.
Under the new regime, EMND would support a U.S. contribution
to a multinational inspection effort under the auspices of the
O rganization.

This

effort

capability of perform ing

would

include developing

a rapid on-site inspection
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suspect site.

The possibility of performing multiple widely-

separated inspections simultaneously is quite real, and EMND
should be prepared to provide support in such a contingency.
EMND should continue its ability to host foreign inspectors
against the possibility of a challenge concerning an alleged U.S.
test.

Assign to EMND the Conduct of CTBT Training
for the International Inspectorate

T he

new

in tern atio n al

O rg an izatio n

will

require

competent and trained personnel to perform inspections.

To

maintain credibility, the Organization will necessarily maintain
a fully deployable inspection capability at all times.

To meet

the intent of the CTBT, the Organization’s inspection team[s] will
necessarily

be m ultinational

and

the

team

must

not

be

composed of so many inspectors from one nation that the
ability to inspect in that nation is thereby compromised.
relatively

large

foreign

cadre w ould

be

required

in

A
the

Organization, for example, if the U.S. were to be challenged.

During the period in which the Organization is forming,
the EMND can be expected to provide a U.S. contribution to
technical inspection capability for the Organization.

EMND

would train U.S. citizens and nationals of other States Parties to
perform inspection duties.

In the interest of both ethical and
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p ractical

concerns

regarding

safety,

EMND

would

have

opportunity to inject the highest and most effective safety
standards into the forming Organization.

D eploym ent

In any deployment of the Organization’s inspection team,
EMND

would have a major

support role.

To meet the

deployment needs embodied in the new treaty, EMND should
acquire

new capabilities.

In

general the new capabilities

enhance EMND’s support of a U.S. contribution and team
members to the Inspectorate during a deployment intended to
detect

or

deployment.

verify

clandestine

testing,

or

to

a

practice

In addition EMND would provide an observer for

those inspections resulting from a U.S. challenge.

EMND would

be expected to learn from initial deployments and to rapidly
inco rp o rate

new

techniques

and

know ledge

into

future

activities.

EMND should retain existing expertise and capabilities
because they are necessary to the Department of Energy’s
mission and relate not only to the requirements of the TTBT
but also to the CTBT.

Existing expertise and capabilities would

enable EMND to function as a consultant, to support U.S. team
members functioning on inspection teams, to provide personnel
for inspection teams and to interpret data from monitoring and
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from inspections.
managing function.

EMND should continue a coordinating and
Additional capabilities will be necessary

when EMND supports a U.S. contribution to a deployment
whose activities are those authorized by the CTBT.

These new

capabilities are set forth below.

Topographic Work

EMND should be prepared to contribute to topographic
and surveying work at any location in the world.

In addition,

EMND should acquire surveying expertise sufficient to perform
three-dimensional surveying in English or metric units at any
location.

EMND should therefore become fam iliar with the

surveying coordinate systems of every nation judged likely to
become an inspected party under the CTBT as well as the
surveying system which the Technical Secretariat chooses to
adopt.

Visual Observations

EMND should retain the observational expertise of its
personnel

in

p erform ing

observational skills

visual

observations.

These

should include detection of evidence of

nuclear weapons testing such as ground disturbance, presence
of drilling equipment, presence of powerlines, presence of test
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cabling,

distressed vegetation,

seism ic

disturbance.

and

Relevant

rockfalls resulting from

personnel

fam iliar with locations judged likely
testing areas in the future.
also be retained.

should

become

to become clandestine

Geologic inspection abilities should

In addition, EMND should acquire ability to

conduct most inspection activities underground.

Therefore, the

personnel should be trained in underground technology and
safety.

Photography and Video Imagery

Regarding its functions of hosting an inspection in the
U.S., EMND should maintain an ability in photography and
imaging.

This ability should include up-to-date video imaging

as well as real-time data transm ission by satellite.
addition,

EMND

should

develop

procedures

to

In
provide

photographic services and imaging ability at any location in U.S.
te rrito ry .

For support of an on-site inspection in foreign territory,
EMND should develop imaging systems which are compatible
with those of the Organization.

EMND should thereby maintain

capability to supply data to the O rganization’s International
Data Center.
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Sampling Gas, Soil and Liquid

EMND should acquire expertise in gas, soil, and liquid
sampling theory and in statistical methods of analyzing and
interpreting

samples.

EMND should acquire

and

maintain

ability to perform sampling for evidence of bomb debris, noble
gases and tritium and for 00%, CH^ and H;.

The TTBT included a restricted protocol, which strictly
lim ited

the sampling procedures which could

be used and

sim ilarly limited the samples which could be obtained.

The

CTBT, as presently envisioned, contains no such limitations.
This difference opens

significant possibilities

overt sampling and also for covert sampling.

for extensive
EMND should

acquire and maintain expertise to interpret sampling results
from the International Data Center.

This expertise should be

sufficient, insofar as the state of the art permits, to locate a
puddle resulting from an underground nuclear weapons test.
Such a capability, along with existing capabilities in drillback
operations, would likely prove useful in on-site inspections in
foreign nations.

This capability would also enable EMND to

control sampling at NTS and to interpret sampling techniques
used during an on-site inspection on U.S. territory.
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Measurement of Radionuclide Activity

The CTBT authorizes radiometric activity to be performed
in holes

as much as 20 meters deep.

EMND should therefore

retain the expertise and ability to perform down-hole radiation
measurements, as well as measurements of radioactivity in the
atmosphere, soil and rock in the vicinity of a suspected site.

Seismological Surveys

EMND should maintain existing seismological surveying
capability developed in response to the TTBT.

In addition,

EMND should retain expertise in ground penetrating radar and
in-hole geophysical techniques as applied to the CTBT.

Magnetic, Gravitational and Thermal Measurements

To remain cognizant of the O rganization’s authorized
abilities,

EMND

should

acquire

expertise

gravitational and thermal measurements.
form

of

contracts

with

academic

in

m agnetic,

This could take the

institutions

as

well

commercial businesses and the National Laboratories.
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D rillbacks

As

developed

above,

d rillb a ck s

have

the

greatest

credibility of all of the O rganization’s inspection techniques.
EMND should therefore accord the drillback activity requisite
resources and capabilities.

Further, EMND should make plans

to support a U.S. contribution to a drillback inspection on a
worldwide basis.

This is a very considerable task, but it would

generate the greatest credibility which the CTBT can make in
preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The drillback scenario envisioned to be performed by the
Organization differs significantly from drillbacks performed at
the Nevada Test Site or from verification drilling performed
under the TTBT.

CTBT drillback operations could be performed

at any location in a very rapid manner, and they would be
intended to verify that a test has taken place rather than to
m easure

the

yield

of

an

O rganization’s drillbacks

announced

could

test.

Any

of

the

produce radioactive cuttings

which would have to be handled with regard to safety and
would

have to be treated

and

disposed

in a responsible

m an n er.

In

addition,

restoration

there

of a drillback

arises

the

operation.

issue

of environmental

There is no present

provision in the CTBT for this activity, but it is nevertheless a
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vitally important issue.

EMND should be a prominent leader in

this area.

Discussion

The

new

explosions

international

results

from

initiative

a changing

for

international

climate and creates new challenges for EMND.
to

reorganize, under

treaty

negotiations,

O rganization

and

banning nuclear
political

The challenge is

DoE Headquarters guidance, to support
to

support a U.S.

contribution to the

to be prepared for a potential challenge

inspection on U.S. territory.

Under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, EMND supported
the

O n-Site

Inspection

Agency in deploym ents

to Novaya

Zemlya and Semipalatinsk to determine the yield of Soviet
nuclear weapons tests by seismic methods or by CORRTEX.
Under the CTBT, the EMND could be expected to support
inspections at any site worldwide.

EMND should acquire signiHcant new capabilities to meet
the

expanded

requirem ents

of

the

new

treaty .

These

capabilities are intended to enable EMND to provide logistical
and operational support to a U.S. contribution to the operations
of

the

O rganization. They include

capabilities

in

global

positioning and surveying, underground exam ination, state-ofthe-art imagery, sampling, down-hole radiation measurements.
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ground penetrating radar and in-hole geophysical, magnetic,
gravitational and thermal m easurements, and a drillback
any location.

at

These new capabilities would enable the EMND to

make a significant contribution to the advancement of nuclear
nonproliferation.
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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS
In the short term, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
will probably be effective to some degree in preventing or
retarding proliferation of nuclear weapons, in that it supports
the Nonproliferation Treaty. Many States Parties can be
expected to adhere to the provisions of the developing
nonproliferation scheme. The monitoring scheme gives every
evidence of credibility and many potentially proliférant parties
WÜ1

certainly weigh the costs of having to face sanctions from

the United Nations Security Council in response to a nuclear
weapons test. However, the first nuclear weapon used in war,
a gun-device using uranium as the fissile material, was not
tested prior to use. The authorities had every reason to expect
that the device would work, given then-available scientific
knowledge.

Modern design procedures are very much

advanced over those available in 1945. For example, many
low-cost desktop computers have much more capability than
those formerly available only in National Laboratories. Testing
is therefore not necessary in the construction and use of a

120
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nuclear weapon; to that degree, the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty is of no effect in preventing proliferation.

C onsidering

a

longer-term

perspective,

a

frightening

prospect emerges from an Augustinian assessment of human
nature and motivations acting in a Structural Realistic system
of nations as described by Waltz and summarized herein.

The

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty intends to create inducements
for potential proliférant parties to refrain from proliferating.
These inducements are public exposure of nuclear weapons
testing activities, and potential responses by the United Nations
Security Council, including economic sanctions and military
action.

In Policy Paradox and Political Reason. Deborah Stone

provides a relevant treatment of inducements.

Stone’s model

assumes that, first, the target of inducement has control of its
own behavior.

When confronted with knowledge of a penalty

or a reward, the model assumes, the target can adapt to the
new circumstances by means of changing its behavior.

Second,

Stone’s model assumes that the target of inducement is a
unitary actor.

“This means,’’ she writes, “not that the actor is

necessarily an individual, but that it is an entity capable of
rational behavior" (212).

This assumption is similar to that of

Morgenthau and other Realistic political scientists who claim
that,

in

international affairs, political

rationally than in other arenas.
that the

target

actors

behave more

Third, Stone’s model assumes

“has some orientation

tow ard

the

future.’’

Inducements are effective, she writes.
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only to the extent that the target cares about the
costs or rewards to be faced in the future and is
w illing to modify current behavior in order to
shape future results. (215)

Stone provides a critique of these assumptions.

There are

situations wherein the designers of the sanctions have made
them

so

reluctant

drastic

that

the

sanction

to impose them.

are

them selves

Inducements and sanctions lose

their credibility in such a situation.
common.

givers

Evasion of sanctions

is

Furthermore, she notes,

new
inducements simply jo in a broad array o f
consequences the target already faces.
The
designer tends to focus on only the inducements he
. . . designs. But for the target, new inducements
always fit into a web of reinforcing and crosscutting
consequences. (223)

In

the

in te rn a tio n a l

en v iro n m e n t re la tin g

to

nonproliferation. Stone’s three criteria are questionable and her
critiques are telling.

First, a proliférant party may not have

control of its own actions.

A nation may have fallen under the

control of a small group of fanatics who pursue policies at
variance with that ordinarily expected.

This development is to

be expected on occasion, given Augustine’s observation

in

C o n fe s sio n s 10:36 that some persons “desire to be feared . . .
simply
abound.

for the pleasure

that it gives.’’

Fearful examples

Second, many national actors do indeed approach

their affairs in a more or less rational manner, but there is no
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guarantee that they would invariably do so.

In an Augustinian

analysis, it would be expected that on occasion they would not
behave rationally.

In A gainst

F a u s tu s

22:74,

Augustine

describes “the desire to do harm, cruel vengence, a disposition
that remains unappeased and implacable, a savage spirit of
rebellion, a lust for domination.”
of irrationality.

This is the ultimate reflection

Third, future orientation is common amongst

national actors, but that is not always so.

Stone’s critique is

devastating to the notion that inducements and sanctions could
be ultimately successful in invariably deterring proliferation.
The Security Council has often declined to take military action
or to impose sanctions upon parties who richly deserve it.
Purposeful proliférants

can be expected to evade the provisions

of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
expected, given an
nature,

that

a

Finally,

it could be

Augustinian pessimistic view of human

p roliférant

may

not

care

resulting from a nuclear weapons test.

about

sanctions

Such a party would

proliferate and test, regardless of the consequences.

From these considerations, the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty may be expected to have little effect on the acquisition
of

nuclear

w eapons

by terrorist

groups

or

by

nations

determined to have them at whatever cost in time, money and
effort.

Fred Charles Ikle, in a Foreign A ffairs article entitled

“The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age,” agrees.
for

these

w eapons,”

he writes,

meaningful international

“ [has

controls” (126).

“Technologies

begun]
There

to

escape

is “little
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insurance against human folly” (125).

Therefore, proliferation

by ideology-driven actors in the M iddle East will not be halted
or even affected very much.

Proliferation can be expected in

the Far East, including Japan, in response to Chinese weapons
development, testing, and American disengagement from East
Asia.

Kongdan

Oh describes

a

significant

potential

for

“proliferation in Japan and South K orea” (166) which may
result from this situation. In that regard, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty contributes to a false sense of security.

The United States has made a decision to maintain an
inventory

of about 3500

nuclear

weapons,

a goal

to

be

achieved by the turn of the century. (National Academy of
Sciences 39).

In a dangerous world, that is the only proper

policy for prudent national leaders

to pursue.

Given that

decision, complete cessation of nuclear weapons testing is not
in the national interest of the U nited States or of any other
declared nuclear wespons state.

The Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty can only hinder the further development and testing of
the U.S. arsenal and therefore must result in an arsenal of
reduced

effectiveness,

relia b ility

and

safety,

com puter

simulations and non-fissile testing notwithstanding.

Any

device

spontaneously degrades

over time and has a finite shelf life.

As one example of the

problem s

nuclear explosive

encountered,

the

h ig h -ex p lo siv e

com ponent

of

implosion-initiated nuclear explosive devices exudes a vapor
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which condenses on the weapon’s other components, thereby
degrading

overall

perform ance.

Weapons

in

the

active

stockpile must be periodically removed for maintenance and
refabrication.

Testing has heretofore been necessary to ensure

that weapons may be relied upon to function properly.

A

complete test ban renders maintenance and reliability issues
problem atic.

Persons com petent in

the design and construction

of

nuclear weapons have a tendency to enter other challenging
fields of work if their skills are not kept current.

They thus

take their expertise with them, and may not be in a position to
make that expertise available in case of a future unspeciHed
need.

Jonathan Weisman has pointed out that, in the United

States’ nuclear weapons laboratories, scientists are continually
seeking other challenges.
scientists

seeking

This attitude leads to many o f the

em ploym ent

moratorium

on testing

(16).

perm anently

banned,

sufficient

elsewhere
If testing
outlets

in

the

indeed

for

these

p resen t

is

to

be

p erso n s’

creative talents should be provided and their skills thereby
retain ed .

The U. S. Department of Energy is required to certify that
every weapon it produces will work as designed.

The question

naturally arises as to how to certify weapons in inventory
under conditions of a test ban.

In the United States, the

current opinion is that weapons can be certified in the short
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term, using computer sim ulations, zero-yield experiments, and
reliance on data from previous tests.

However, in an undefined

long term, there is no proven precedent other than that of
testing to establish certifiability.

In The Citv of God 14:13, Augustine reminds us that
our first parents fell into open disobedience
because already they were secretly corrupted; for
the evil act had never been done had not an evil
will preceeded it. And what is the origin of our evil
will but pride? And what is pride but the craving
for undue exaltation.
And this undue exaltation
becomes a kind of end to itself.

Each

generation passes such a will to the next. The result,

in

The City of God 14:15, is that “our flesh . . . now tormentsus by
insubordination.”

Continuing in The City of God 15:4, Augustine

describes the human society which necessarily follows.

It is

often divided against itself by litigations, wars,
quarrels, and such victories as are either lifedestroying or short-lived. For each part of [society]
that arms itself against another part of it seeks to
triumph over the nations though itself in bondage
to vice. Peace is purchased by toilsome war

Humankind

has

already

fought

one

nuclear

war.

Were

Augustine the Realist alive today, he would point out that,
given the precedents and despite all efforts to the contrary, in
a sufficiently desperate situation, nuclear weapons will be used
again.
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UST OF ACRONYMS

CORRTEX

A method o f determining the yield o f a
nuclear weapon by means of analysis of
seismic waves generated by the explosion

CTBT

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a pending
treaty which would ban all nuclear explosions
conducted by the signatory nations

DNA

Defense Nuclear Agency

DoE or DOE

United States Department of Energy, a
cabinet-level agency chajiged with assembly
and testing of nuclear weapons

EMND

Emergency Management and Nonproliferation
Division, Nevada Operations Office, U. S.
Department of Energy

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

INF

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

IDC

International Data Center

LTBT

Limited Test Ban Treaty, a treaty by which
the United States and the former Soviet Union
agreed to conduct nuclear weapons test
underground, not in the atmosphere, space or
oceans

NV or NVO

Nevada Operations Office, U. S. Department of
Energy, located in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Responsible for operations on the Nevada Test
Site

127
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NPT

N onproliferation Treaty, a treaty by which
nations agree to refrain from developing
nuclear weapons. Originally signed in 1970,
renewed in 1995.

NTS

Nevada Test Site, a tract of land of more than
1200 square miles in southern N evada
devoted to nuclear weapons testing, and to
other national security activities

OSIA

On-Site Inspection Agency, the entity of the U.
S. D epartm ent of Defense which conducts
nuclear weapons test site inspections under
the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban
T re a ty

TTBT

Threshold Test Ban Treaty, a treaty between
the United States and the former Soviet Union
which limited nuclear weapons tests to 150
kilotons yield, and which p rovided for
b ilateral inspections of nuclear w eapons
testing sites
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